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Abstract 
Infrastructure has been a bottleneck for industrialization of developing countries. 
After decades of economic growth led by investment in infrastructure, China released its first 
global strategy in 2013, One Belt One Road (BRI), to improve infrastructure in less developed 
countries along the belt and road. Although economic development has been witnessed in 
some BRI members, large amount of investments from China raised concern over debt crisis 
from the Western world and host countries. Countries receiving loans from China are 
struggling to effectively manage the BRI projects. Some are renegotiating the investments 
with China and some BRI members even canceled them. However, one reality that cannot be 
ignored is that the majority of BRI members have successfully finished their BRI projects and 
integrated them into the national economy. The main goal of this paper is to determine whether 
three elected BRI members (Djibouti, Pakistan and Maldives) have been exposed to the debt 
crisis caused by massive investments from China. This research also covers details of the BRI 
contracts signed by China and BRI members in which the amount of investments, interest rates 
of the loans and the cooperation models will be explained. By comparing debt conditions of 
BRI members with the debt crisis of Mexico in 1982, readers should draw the conclusion that 
a limited number of BRI countries are facing a debt crisis caused by China’s BRI. These BRI 
members are in a difficult stage of economic development where many new developed 
economies have conquered. Also discussed in this paper are the roles of the IMF and the World 
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One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI) was first announced by the Chinese 
president Xi Jinping in 2013. This initiative is the heritage of the ancient Chinese Silk 
Road during the Han dynasty, when Rome and China traded silk with one other. The 
modern BRI involves massive investments in infrastructure in Eastern Europe, Asia 
and Africa and is devoted to building a community towards a shared future for 
mankind. As China’s first global economic strategy, the BRI also served to deepen 
the Chinese reform and opening-up policies. China’s economy has been in a new 
normal situation. Since 2013, China has been experiencing lower economic growth 
and excess production capability. Long period investment-led growth created record 
high GDP growth rate, and thousands of steel and concrete factories in China. There 
are over 1,400 steel factories in China with annual production of 800 million tons. In 
December 2019, the production of crude steel in China accounted for 55% of global 
production. The BRI’s investment in infrastructure can effectively absorb excess 
production, upgrade Chinese industries and avoid the middle-income trap1 (Jin, 2018). 
Meanwhile, the world economy is in a mediocre period. Globalization and anti-
globalization both exist in today’s world. The BRI is designed to improve economic 
integration, policy coordination and infrastructure connection.
 





However, critics predict the BRI is a debt trap for investment recipients. At 
the IMF-PBC conference in 2018, the IMF Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, 
stated that“these ventures can also lead to a problematic increase in debt, potentially 
limiting other spending as debt services rise, and creating an imbalance of payment 
challenges.” (Lagarde, 2018) Unlike the Marshall Plan, which mainly gave grants and 
did not request repayments, clauses of BRI often involve commercial loans. China has 
invested in over 3,000 projects in the BRI. In 2015, 49 participating countries signed 
$17.8 billion contracts with Chinese companies and a total of $12 billion were 
executed. A report from the Center for Global Development2 (Is Pakistan Sitting on 
China's BRI Debt Bomb? , 2018) found eight countries were at a debt risk due to BRI: 
Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan and 
Tajikistan. Djibouti has 86% external debt to GDP in 2017, and 80% of its debt is 
owed to China, according to the Center for Global Development. Sri Lanka’s Port 
Hambantota was leased to China for 99 years as an exchange of the $1.1 trillion 
Chinese debt written off. Pakistan will renegotiate a trade agreement in the $62 billion 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor plan. Financial crisis has pushed Pakistan to its 
13th bailout with the IMF within three decades. Developing countries such as Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sierra Leone also either backed away or cancelled BRI 
projects because of BRI projects’ high costs and impacts on national debt and the 
economy (Chandran, 2019).  
 





However, after 7 years of the first BRI project was launched, China and BRI 
members are still signing more contracts. By analyzing three BRI members—Djibouti, 
Pakistan and Maldives—this thesis critically discusses those worries as perhaps 
unfounded. If the BRI is a debt trap and can cause massive debt crisis to its members, 
China’s first global strategy will face a large obstacle. The cooperation between China 
and BRI members will also need to be adjusted accordingly.  
In this thesis, Chapter Two will introduce necessary literature for this essay. 
Basic concepts related to debts between countries will be explained; readers will 
understand the problems and solutions for international borrowing. In Chapter Three, 
readers will have a general picture of three targeted BRI members’ trade with China 
and details of their BRI projects. International trade between BRI members and China 
partly provides foreign reserves to external debts, which China offers; it can also serve 
as a barometer of three members’ debt statuses. The BRI projects explain the model 
of cooperation and details of investments in the BRI. Readers will discover the 
differences between BRI investment and other forms of international borrowing in 
this chapter; some answers to concerns previously mentioned can also be found 
through exploring the model of cooperation. Chapter Four further compares debt 
conditions of three targeted countries with Mexico. By analyzing certain related ratios, 
readers will have a clear image of three BRI members’ debt borrowed from China. 
Chapter Five echoes the debt solutions in Chapter Two. This chapter provides 
practical debt solutions to prevent BRI members being struck by debt crisis. Readers 
will also find the reason that BRI members participate in the program even though the 
West has criticized it. This chapter also addresses concerns from the West. 
Transparency has always been a drawback for the BRI. By improving international 
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cooperation with the IMF and World Bank, the BRI can be more accessible to the 
West, who has objections toward the BRI. 
Mexico has historically fallen into debt crisis. In the 1970s, the country 
borrowed a large amount of funds from multilateral and bilateral agents to develop its 
infrastructure. Its road to industrialization was disturbed by the sharp drop of oil prices 
in the 1980s. As a major export product, oil could not bring in enough foreign 
exchange to pay back Mexico’s external debts. Although the Mexican government 
made efforts to devaluate the peso to increase exports, the foreign reserves still ran 
out. The rising interest rates in the U.S. and Europe in 1979 increased the exchange 
rate of the US dollar, which made it harder for debtors to repay their debt. In August 
1982, Mexico declared it could not service its debt. The U.S. banks owned about 30% 
of $75 billion commercial loans of Mexico, who had $98 billion foreign debt in total. 
The external debts lent by the 9 largest US banks were equal to 233% of their primary 
capital. By the end of 1985, Latin America had accepted around $217 billion foreign 
debts from commercial banks. US banks held 41.7% of these debts, and European and 
Canadian banks held 37% and 7.6% respectively.  
The IMF issued $3.8 billion loans to Mexico in December 1982, helping 
Mexico to alleviate its debt obligations. The IMF was a super credit agency in foreign 
aid. Before the aid was given by the consortiums, the IMF would decide whether the 
recipients were credit-worthy for relief funds. As an international organization, the 
IMF is reckoned better able to advise governments on sensitive matters of financial 
policy and to suggest corrective measures in return for credits. The suggested 
measures usually include exchange rate practices, import regulations, control of the 
domestic budget deficit, bank credit controls and policies towards foreign investment3 
 
3 Payer, Cheryl. (1974). The Debt Trap. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press. Page 29 
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(Payer, The Debt Trap: the IMF and the Third World, 1974). The quantitative 
commitments for these terms are often specified by the IMF, and the aid will be 
suspended if the government fails to keep the commitments.
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2. Literature Review 
       2.1 Internal Debt and External Debt 
A country’s debt can be split into internal debt, which is owed to creditors 
within the country, and external debt, which is owed to foreign lenders. The debt 
in BRI projects is external debt. According to Investopedia.com,  internal debt is 
owned to lenders who are within the country. External debt is borrowed from 
foreign lenders including governments, commercial banks and international 
financial institutions. The borrowers of external debt usually repay the debt in the 
currency that the loan was made, so the borrowing countries may sell or export 
goods to the lender’s country. In the Two-Gap models of development designed 
by Harrod4 (Harrod, 1939) and Domar5 (Domar, 1946), they pointed out that net 
capital imports can be used to bridge the saving gap and the foreign currency gap. 
The first gap is between saving and investment in the economy. A less developed 
country usually has low savings, which is not adequate to start heavy investment 
in infrastructure. External debts from developed countries is an effective solution 
to fill in the saving gap; or a less developed country can also participate in 
international trade to generate surplus, which can be used to fill the saving gap. 
However, trade with other countries leads to the second gap, which is the foreign
 
4 Harrod, Roy F. (1939). “An Essay in Dynamic Theory”. The Economic Journal. 49 (193): 14-33. 





currency gap. Most less developed countries can only provide primary goods to 
advanced economies. Production of exporting requires basic machine, capital and 
technology. Less developed countries have limited accesses to these resources but 
to import from other countries, which can create a cost differential in a short run. 
The internal debt markets of BRI countries are not adequate for their own 
infrastructure construction as of low domestic savings. The foreign currency 
reserves from trade are not sufficient to import the equipment needed for 
industrialization, either. Most countries turn to external borrowing, which can also 
bring in technology, management and technical training.  
Economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff assert in “Growth in a 
Time of Debt”6 (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010) that the growth thresholds for external 
debt are considerably lower than for the thresholds for total public debt. The 
relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt-
GDP ratios below a threshold of 90% of GDP. Above 90%, median growth rates 
fall by 1%, and average growth falls considerably more. However, growth 
deteriorates significantly at external debt levels over 60%, and further still or even 
declines when the levels exceed 90%. Based on Reinhart and Rogoff’s data from 
59 countries, external burdens are particularly high in Europe, where the ratio of 
external debt to GDP is over 200% in advanced European countries and around 
100% in emerging European countries. The ratio of US gross external debt 
liabilities to GDP was less than half of Europe’s in 2009, according to Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s findings; Japan had a much smaller size of external debt. The Latin 
American figure was around 50% from 2003 to 2009. Interestingly, the change in 
 
6 Reinhart, C., & Rogoff, K. (2010). “Growth in a Time of Debt”. 16-20 
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external debt to GDP ratio in Latin America was -30% compared with 50% in 
advanced economies from 2003 to 2009. 
       2.2 Liquidity Problem and Solvency Problem 
The liquidity problem refers to a short-run debt service problem. A country 
with foreign debt has a liquidity problem when its assets cannot be immediately 
converted to a form acceptable to creditors, although the debtor country will 
eventually repay the debt. The liquidity problem can be resolved through 
temporary finance.  
The solvency problem refers to a country’s incapability to repay its external 
debt. A country is in insolvency if it can never repay its external debt due to its 
poor economic condition and dismal economic prospects. 
       2.3 Causes of the Developing Countries’ Debt Problem 
In the co-authored book “International Economics”7  (Appleyard & Field, 
2017), Dennis Appleyard and Alfred Field point out that the factors of the debt 
problem vary from country to country. Some factors are generalized by the two 
authors. 
(a) Oil Price 
The change of oil price is a prominent factor in a country’s debt 
problem. The increase of oil price during 1973-1974 and 1979-1981 forced 
many emerging and developing countries to pay more for oil imports. It was 
necessary for these countries to borrow external debts, which were lent by 
industrialized countries’ commercial banks. Mexico’s debt crisis in 1982 was 
directly caused by the change of oil price, but in an opposite way. As a 
 
7 Appleyard, D., & Field, A. (2017). International Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill Education. 
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petroleum exporter, Mexico’s foreign exchange reserves plummeted as the 
price of oil dropped in 1982. It became impossible for Mexico to service its 
external debts, and a debt crisis struck Mexico’s economy in a chain reaction. 
In terms of the three BRI countries in this paper, refined petroleum is the top 
import for Pakistan and Maldives; Djibouti is also an oil importer. Influences 
described above will happen to them if oil price soars.     
(b) Recessions in the Industrialized Countries 
The recessions in the 1970s were caused mainly by the oil shocks and 
partly resulted from anti-inflationary macroeconomic policies adopted in 
industrialized countries. Imports from developing countries to industrialized 
countries decreased as of the recessions. However, developing countries must 
maintain a flow of imports to ensure their economic growth. As a result, more 
foreign borrowings were conducted by developing countries. The US is the 
top export destination for Pakistan and Maldives, and the UK is the first 
export destination for Djibouti. The trade conditions of the three BRI 
countries are closely related to the economy of industrialized countries. If 
these industrialized economies experience a recession, the three BRI countries’ 
exports will be largely affected. Then the foreign exchange reserves and 
capabilities of external debt service will deteriorate due to a chain effect.  
(c) Real Interest Rates 
The real interest rate is equal to the nominal interest rate minus the 
expected rate of inflation. The real interest in the 1970s was low because of 
high inflation, which encouraged developing countries to borrow more 
external debts. In the 1980s, the inflation rate of the U.S. plummeted, and the 
real interest rate increased. Developing countries who borrowed existing debt 
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services had more financial burdens. Mexico was one of the countries that had 
difficulties in servicing foreign debt because of the high real interest rate in 
the US. Approximately 75% of the interest payments were tied to the US 
interest rate and the London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR), which 
repriced every six months. Mexico’s debt owed to foreign institutions was 
especially vulnerable to repricing risk driven by changes in the 
macroeconomic conditions of the creditor nations. In terms of BRI loans, the 
interest rates of loans are not released to researchers. Partly because the rates 
for different projects are various, given conditions of countries, and the 
Chinese financial institutions purposely conceal them to avoid competition 
among BRI members. BRI countries will face the same challenge that Mexico 
experienced in 1982 if China decides to raise interest rates. But the strong 
political will of the Chinese government toward the success of the BRI can 
facilitate renegotiation between the debtors and creditor, which is the most 
different aspect from American lending.  
(d) Primary-Product Prices 
Primary products are goods without a manufacturing process; 
examples are oil, water, fruit and wood. Developing countries are main 
exporters of primary products. The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, created by 
economists Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, points out that the price of 
primary goods declines relative to that of manufactured goods. As economist 
Hans Singer mentions in “The Distribution of Gains between investing and 
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borrowing countries”8 (Singer, 1950), the specialization of underdeveloped 
countries in the  export of food and raw materials to industrialized countries, 
largely as a result of investment by the latter, has been unfortunate for the 
underdeveloped countries for two reasons: (a) because it removes most of the 
secondary and cumulative effects of investment from the country in which the 
investment took place to the investing country; and (b) because it diverts the 
underdeveloped countries into types of activity offering less scope for 
technical progress, internal and external economies taken by themselves, and 
withholds from the course of their economic history a central factor of 
dynamic radiation which has revolutionized society in the industrialized 
countries. Compared with industrialized countries, less developed countries 
have not experienced the same growth in income, capital, employment and 
technical knowledge by exporting their primary goods. It might be even more 
important that the price of primary goods has been heavily reduced against 
sellers, limiting the benefits to underdeveloped counties.  
The decreasing price of primary products in the 1980s caused 
developing countries to borrow more external debt to finance their imports. 
Mexico was mainly affected by the lower price of its primary product—oil—
in the financial crisis of 1982. Most countries participating in the BRI are less 
developed countries whose exports are mainly primary products. Coffee, 
wood charcoal, house linens, rice and fish fillets are top exports for the three 
BRI countries with difficult indebtedness. Incomes from trading these 
 
8 Hans Singer. (1950). “The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrwoing Counties”. The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-second Annual 




primary commodities will change along the price changes of these products, 
which will reflect on their Current Account. A long term deteriorating Current 
Account will jeopardize the country’s debt service capability. Compared with 
Mexico, these three BRI countries’ Current Accounts are unsatisfactory; this 
is also the reason that countries are constantly looking for financial supports 
from various sources. Besides borrowing from countries like Saudi Arabia, 
China, and the US, etc., multilateral borrowing (IMF and World Bank) is also 
an alternative method for BRI countries. Nonetheless intricate requirements 
and long processes of multilateral borrowing daunt these less developed 
countries, who try to keep their sovereignty independent.   
(e) Domestic Policies 
How a country uses its loans will affect its capabilities to repay its 
external debt. If the external loans are used for consumption other than for 
productive investment, the investment will not directly generate cash flows to 
serve the debt. The excessive monetary policy associated with government 
budget deficits will also influence a country’s debt services. Furthermore, 
mismanagement of domestic financial institutions, poor domestic price 
controls, and overvalued currency will all hinder a country’s ability to repay 
its external debt. Mexico experienced an enormous fiscal expansion under the 
administration of the president Luis Echeverria. The budget deficits soared to 
10% of GDP in 1975 and 1976. The growth rate of the monetary base 
accelerated to 33.8% in 1975, and the inflation rate was over 20% in 1973 and 
1974. A large amount of remunerations from oil exports for Mexico also 
enabled the country to reinvigorate economic confidence and direct the most 
dynamic development. Its public sector borrowed $37 billion from 
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international lending institutions and $24 billion was serviced to the public 
debt. The large-scale intervention of Mexico’s government in trade and 
foreign investment policies made many state-owned companies unprofitable, 
which became a landmine for its debt crisis. As far as BRI countries, the 
corruption problem in Maldives has also led to the increasing cost of projects. 
But Maldives’s fiscal strategy involves a good combination of external 
debtors and debt types; the government is trying to keep a moderate increase 
of its external debts. The mismanagement problem of BRI projects in Pakistan 
has forced the country to reconsider the investment in the China and Pakistan 
economic corridor. Pakistan is also looking for new bridge financing for 
current debt services. Because BRI projects are all intended to develop the 
public sector, the cost for which normally requires a long time to break even, 
these public enterprises’ capacities of profitability determine the success of 
the BRI. The state-owned enterprises in Maldives and Pakistan both have 
better performances than those in Mexico. 
(f) Capital Flight from the Developing Countries 
Domestic citizens send funds overseas due to concerns about rapid 
inflation, low real interest rate and political instability. Mexico’s annual 
inflation rate exceeded 20% from mid-1978 to mid-1980. The overvalued 
exchange rate also increased the fear of devaluation and led to capital flight. 
The peso depreciated 16% from 1980 to 1982 and the real interest rate turned 
to negative. Mexico’s capitalists were more interested in accumulating capital 
through rentier practices in 1982 but in industries with low profits. The state 
lost control over the speculative capital as political and economic power of 
finance capital increased. The significant difference between BRI capital and 
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capital in Mexico in 1982 is that the BRI capital is guided and controlled by 
the Chinese government who can effectively prevent capital flight. Besides, 
the direct investments in BRI infrastructure projects, other than lending to 
local banks, can increase the investment precision and restrain speculation of 
BRI capital. It is not necessary for BRI members to have the fear of capital 
flight now.   
(g) “Loan-Pushing” by Banks in Developed Countries9 (Darity & Horn, 1988) 
The large amount of outstanding loans brought risks not only to 
developing countries but to developed countries. The banks in advanced 
economies with enough funds, fueled by the deregulation of financial 
institutions, were anxious to expand their loan portfolios. As a result, the 
external loans were often made without sound economic analysis or risk 
considerations. Meanwhile, the burdens of external debt were easily ignored 
by the banks in advanced economies due to more debt talks aggressively made 
by developing countries. However, loan pushing is hardly seen in the BRI due 
to the limited supplies of funds and the overwhelming demands. All 
investments are assessed and lent by Chinese financial institutions based on 
the necessity of local infrastructure development. Meanwhile, the buyer’s 
credit is favored, and most lent to Maldives in 2016. Compared with other 
external loans, buyer’s credit can provide short term funds but with a higher 
interest rate. The portion of buyer’s credit in Maldives’ external debts is 
relatively high and still rising in recent years. It is possible and economically 
practical for Chinese financial institutions to push their high profitable 
 
9 Darity, W., & Horn, B. (1988). The Loan Pushers: The Role of Commercial Banks in the 
International Debt Crisis. Cambridge: Ballinger. 
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products to BRI members, which can increase the cost of external debts and 
the risks of illiquidity for BRI countries. 
       2.4 Possible Solutions to the Debt Problem 
(a) Changing Domestic Policies 
Change of policy is a long-term solution that deals with a country’s 
temporary illiquidity. The structural adjustment policies of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank is an example of this solution. When a 
debtor borrows new loans from institutions, conditionality measures 
(austerity policies) are normally needed to be adopted by developing debtors. 
These policies involve reduction of government budget deficits, control of 
money supply, and the adoption of a realistic exchange rate. A country’s trade 
balance and ability for debt services will be improved by devaluation along 
with contractionary monetary and fiscal policies. Mexico is an example that 
implemented changing domestic policies after the debt crisis in 1982. The 
Mexican government gradually retreated from micromanagement of its 
economy, which became more liberal after the crisis. Pakistan’s government 
also faced the requests of austerity policies from the IMF while seeking bridge 
funds for BRI projects. But Pakistan cannot rely on the IMF for immediate 
funds because of the longer lending process within the multilateral institution. 
Among BRI members, Pakistan’s economic corridor project is the largest 
investment from China. Most investments in other members are not large 
enough to change their domestic policies. The BRI investments in roads, 
hydraulic dams and bridges only provide limited funds for industrialization. 
It is not necessary for the countries who receive relatively smaller BRI 
16 
 
investments, which are the most cases, to change their domestic policies due 
to BRI loans.  
(b) Debt Rescheduling  
This is also a solution for liquidity problem. In a debt rescheduling, a 
debtor normally has a lower interest rate and longer maturity. The “Paris Club,” 
a consortium known to deal with rescheduling, has rescheduled a large 
number of debts for Africa and Mexico. On December 10, 1982, US 
commercial banks rescheduled $23 billion of capital payments with Mexico. 
The “Baker Plan” and “Brady Plan” were implemented to reschedule Mexican 
external debts. The US commercial banks allowed Mexico to pay smaller 
payment streams in exchange for the original payments that could not be 
serviced. In “Making the Brady Plan work”10 (Sachs, 1989), Jeffrey Sachs 
points out that the Baker Plan assumed that stretching out Mexico’s 
repayment could help restore the country’s banking system. What the Brady 
Plan recognized was that Mexico could not solve the problem without debt 
reduction, because the continuing crisis caused by the large stock of bad debt 
hindered the country’s prosperity. Furthermore, the debt reduction did not 
make a significant change to the nominal debt of Mexico as of new financing. 
The discount bond reduced Mexico’s debt by approximately $6.7 billion, 
which was close to the amount of new financing. Given the short period of 
time after the launch of the BRI, debt rescheduling has not been used by the 
creditor and debtors. Based on the experiences of China and its debtors, and 
China’s expectation for its global strategy, it is predictable that this will be a 
 




main technique to adjust the BRI loans if BRI members experience problems 
in regard to debt services.  
(c) Debt Relief 
Debt relief is intended to reduce a debtor’s principal or interest rate 
with an anticipation that the debtor would carry out market and growth-
oriented reforms. IMF or the World Bank can use a pool of money to 
guarantee the new bonds issued by debtors. These bonds are sold to existing 
lenders to retire the old debt, which can reduce the outstanding debt. The other 
way is to reduce the interest rate on new debt than on the old debt, which can 
also ease debt burdens. Both debt relief and rescheduling were involved in 
solutions to Mexican debt crisis in 1982 through the Baker Plan and the Brady 
Plan. China has been using debt relief with Africa, but apparently the Chinese 
financial institutions will not favor this solution because of capital loss. On 
one hand, Chinese financial institutions are avoiding debt relief; on the other 
hand, Chinese contractors are maintaining operations of local projects to 
ensure cash flows. These two methods can ensure the benefits for Chinese 
financial agencies.  
(d) Debt-Equity Swaps 
A debt-equity swap is when foreign creditors exchange the debt claim 
for local shares of stock in a productive enterprise. The debt burden of 
developing countries can be eased, and the creditors are holding equity in an 
ongoing company. The advantages of this solution depend on the performance 
of the company involved. Banks can be sellers, traders and direct investors of 
debt-equity swaps, and all roles are beneficial to banks. The disadvantage of 
the swaps is that it takes time for a company with financial problems to start 
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benefiting. Companies in this situation, especially newly privatized 
companies, are not likely to realize sufficient profitability in a short amount 
of time. After Mexico’s debt crisis, debt-equity swaps helped transfer foreign 
capital to some of the country’s unprofitable companies. In the 1989-92 debt 
package, the US and Mexico agreed to use debt-to-equity swap to stimulate 
investments in infrastructure; meanwhile, privatization of assets in the public 
sector was also conducted in the swaps. Mexican national and foreign 
companies took over the assets at a discount from 55 cents to 65 cents on a 
dollar value. The great deal did not last long, however, due to high inflation 
coming along with the debt-to-equity swap. The deal was suspended and was 
not revived until 1990. BRI member Sri Lanka leased one port to China for 
99 years as a debt-equity swap. It is the least favorite solution for local 
governments in BRI projects; China has not accepted more debt-equity swaps 
after the case of Sri Lanka. Given the critiques of China’s new colonialism, 
participants of the BRI are cautious of implementing debt-equity swaps. 
(e) The Secondary Market of External Debt 
Since 1982 banks have tried to eliminate claims on one country and 
to concentrate claims on another country whose prospects and future relations 
are more foreseeable. Lee Buchheit11 (Buchheit, 1986) mentions in “Legal 
Issues in Trading Sovereign Debt” that purchasing banks could have a special 
relation with debtor countries, which increased the banks’ chances of seeing 
the obligations repaid. Some banks even sold their loans at a discount to get 
cash. Banks would also purchase their external debts from some business-
 
11 Buchheit, Lee. “Legal Issues in Trading Sovereign Debt”. 1986. 
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profitable countries, according to Frydl and Sobol12 (Frydl & Sobol, 1988). 
Not only the creditors in developed countries, but also investors and debtor 
countries participated in the secondary market of external debt in the late 
1980s, which made the market more active. In 1986, Nissan using Citibank 
as a broker bought $60 million Mexican debt for $40 million. Then Nissan 
traded the debt with the Banco de Mexico for an $54 million worth of equity 
investment in Mexican pesos. For countries in the BRI, there has been no sign 
of trading loans in the secondary market. One main reason is that many 
Chinese contractors are operating local infrastructure projects, which makes 
the trading more sophisticated if the BRI loans were to be listed on the 
secondary market. In the future, it is not impossible for BRI members and 
Chinese financial institutions to trade their loans and to realize their mutual 
benefits.  Mexico’s debt crisis in 1980s can help readers to understand well 
the causes of the liquidity problem for BRI members. From conditions of 
global economy to domestic policies, readers will see repeated history in 
selected BRI members. However, these conditions should be carefully 
assessed given the different times and various economic strength of BRI 
members. The same indicator of debt crisis does not necessarily mean the 
same result, because the policy makers will learn and strive to avoid a crisis 
situation similar to what occurred in Mexico.
 
12 Frydl, Edward and Sobol, Dorothy, (1988). “Prospects for LDC Debt Management: debt reduction 




3. BRI’s Indebtedness 
 
This chapter will introduce trade conditions and project contracts of five 
selected BRI countries. Trade income is the direct source of servicing external debt. 
The five countries’ trade balance with China is listed in the following spreadsheet. As 
the top supplier to all five countries, China owns trade surplus with all five BRI 
members. As a result, it is difficult for these members to service their Chinese external 
debts with trade income from China. China is the only country with positive trade 
balance with all trade partners in the following chart. These BRI members’ 
international trade will not provide them with extra US dollars to service the Chinese 
yuan.  
Three countries’ contracts with China will also be discussed; they are Djibouti, 
Pakistan and Maldives.  As mentioned in the introduction, among 65 BRI participating 
countries, there are eight countries in debt crisis according to a report from the Center 
for Global Development: Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The three countries receiving more focused 
discussion in this paper were selected due to their globally strategic locations and 
diplomatic relations with China. The geographic location of Djibouti is significant to 
international shipping routes. It connects the marine routes of Europe and Asia as an 
important commercial hub and military supply base. Maldives, a fort in Indian Ocean, 
also shares the geographic significance on the ocean route of BRI. Pakistan is the 
largest BRI funds recipient who also keeps a close political relationship with China. 
Besides the eight countries targeted by the Center for Global Development, the other 
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57 countries’ indebtedness is not negatively affected by BRI if we follow their 
research findings. It is fair and necessary to discuss BRI countries who have well 
performed external debt management. Kenya’s BRI projects will be introduced as a 
positive example in Africa, where many Chinese companies and individuals are 
heavily invested. Meanwhile, on the silk belt between Europe and Asia, Uzbekistan is 
located at the crossroads of Central Asia. As a landlocked country, Uzbekistan sets an 
example of strategy development for the BRI countries who similarly do not posess a 
sea gate. The projects in Uzbekistan have enlightening significance for the less 
developed countries constrained by efficient transportation.  
To better understand the risks of external debts for Djibouti, Pakistan and 
Maldives, comparison of the three countries with Mexico will be presented. In the 
catastrophic debt crisis of the 1980s, Latin America experienced high unemployment 
and dropped income, the three main victims of which were Brazil, Argentina and 
Mexico. As a neighbor of the largest economy, Mexico owns the geographic 
advantage of linking South America and North America. Adequate external funds did 
not help Mexico to seize a booming economy in 1982, resulting in the country’s worst 
lost decade since the 1930s. Will the economic development of BRI countries who 
own a large amount of external debts be trapped by foreign loans? By comparing data 
and exploring reasons in depth, the risks and opportunities will be explained to BRI 
countries.  
The infrastructure projects in BRI countries are the source of concerns and 
the main difference from other external loans. The contracts between BRI countries 
and China will be presented including the models of engineering, source of capital 
and financial ratios. Readers can better understand structures of BRI projects from the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































However, because of various economic conditions of BRI countries, rates of 
external debts are not easily accessible. BRI projects are independent from each other 
so that there is no universal regulation on loan terms among participating members. 
The data from Pakistan is more sufficient than that of Djibouti, which is the case of 
different disclosure systems. Intensive research in countries with more reliable 
information can be more easily accessible; for countries with little information 
released, publications from China and the third party are the mains sources of data. 
Limitation of data in key BRI countries restricts the comparison among members.       
3.1 Countries With “Unhealthy” Indebtedness 
Djibouti 
According to the IMF, Djibouti’s external debt over GDP ratio was formerly 
87.3%, indicating a high risk of debt distress. The ratio has been kept high in recent 
years: 84.9% in 2016 and 86.9% in 2017. The IMF has estimated that the external debt 
over GDP ratio will be 63.1% from 2020 to 2036. 
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Djibouti ranks 193rd in the worldwide export economy, according to the 
Observatory of Economic Complexity. In 2017, its total value of export was $56.6 
million, and the value of import was $3.89 billion. The total trade balance was 
negative $3.83 billion in 2017. Like other developing economies, Djibouti exports 
low value-added products including coffee (33%), wood charcoal (8.4%) and dried 
legumes (4.1%). The main destinations of Djibouti’s exports are European countries. 
The exports have been decreasing at an annualized rate of 2.6% from $63.3 million in 
2012 to $56.6 million in 2017. 
Djibouti’s main imports are palm oil (6.2%), delivery trucks (3.5%) and rice 
(2.7%).  Its imports increased 6.7% from $2.82 billion in 2012 to $3.89 billion in 2017. 
Djibouti’s top suppliers are China, India and Indonesia.   
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One major project in Djibouti is the $3.5 billion Chinese-built free trade zone 
started in January 2017. The free trade zone covers 48 square kilometers and was built 
by China’s Dalian Port Corporation. A new Doraleh Multipurpose Port, beside the 
free trade zone, has been completed and is in operation. The port was built by the 
state-owned China Merchants Ports Holdings Company, and cost $580 million13 
(Ports, 2017). The free trade zone is designed as “front port-middle zone-rear city,” 
which combines a deep-water port, free trade zone and city center. The development 
of the free trade zone can make Djibouti a logistic center, manufacturing zone and 
service campus. Djibouti holds the neck of Eastern Africa. This important strategic 
position helps Djibouti to become the Central Business District (CBD) in Eastern 
 
13 “One Belt One Road-China’s Merchant Ports Holdings Company’s Project in Djibouti” 
http://www.sohu.com/a/140291579_664818. 
     
         
                     
                  
     
    
            
    
           
     
    
                    
     
            
    
      
        
              
                 
    
    
    
                    
                         
     
               
      
        
        
             
                 
    
     
                
           
        
        
     
         
              
           
                           
        
    
               
     
    
        
              
    
     
    
    
    
        
     
       
    
         
               
    
                 
           
              
     
    
          
            
       
          
            
            
             
The Imports and Import origins of Djibouti 
     
     
    
            
   
     
    
         
    
     
     
    
           
    
        
    
            
    
      
        
          
    
     
    
      
   
     
     
   
     
       
    
             
      
             




Africa. The other project in Djibouti is Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway (CCGP, 2017). 
It connects Ethiopia’s capital and port of Doraleh in Djibouti and provide Ethiopia 
with sea access. The railway was in service in October 2016 and will serve 95% of 
trade in Ethiopia. The project costs $4 billion including train purchase. The Exim 
Bank of China financed $2.9 billion of the whole project, covering 70% funding in 
Ethiopia and 85% funding in Djibouti. Both countries bought credit insurance for 
loans from China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation. The loan in Ethiopia was 
lent to railway corporation, backed by Ethiopian government. The loan in Djibouti 
was lent to Department of Treasury, backed by Djiboutian government.  
 This railroad contract is Engineering Procurement Construction plus 
operations and maintenance (EPC+OM), which grants Chinese companies the rights 
to purchase all materials required and to manage the railroad after construction14 
(CCGP, 2017). In EPC+OM, the contractor is fully responsible for design, purchase 
and construction; while Djibouti is not involved in the construction until the project is 
transferred to Djibouti government. The contractors are China Civil Engineering 
Construction Corporation (CCECC) and China Railway No.2 Group. All trains on 
Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad were built by NORICO International, a Chinese 
construction engineering company participating in the BRI. The operators are CCECC 
and China Railway Group, who will also provide technical support and training to 
local employers in the following 6 years after 2016. The Ethiopia-Djibouti Standard 
Gauge Rail Transport S.C. was jointly established by governments of Ethiopia and 
Djibouti in 2017, and it will take over the administration in 2024. African Railway 
 





Academy was also founded to train rail engineers for preparation of the railway’s 
administration. 
Pakistan 
According to the IMF, Pakistan’s external debt was $95.4 billon or 30.3% of 
GDP in 2017. In 2018, its foreign debt jumped to $104.2 billion which was 345% of 
its export receipts. The IMF projected that Pakistan’s external debt will be rising to 
$130 billion in four years.  
As the 68th largest export economy, Pakistan mainly exports house linens 
(13%), non-knit men’s suits (7.7%), and rice (6.6%). Its top destinations of exports 
are the US, Germany and China. In 2017, its trade balance was negative $30.9 billion 
with $24.8 billion exports and $55.6 billion imports. Pakistan is a good example of a 
less developed exporter who mainly exports primary products. From the following 
chart we will find most of its exports are related to cloth and food which bring in fewer 
profits compared with manufactured goods. More importantly, Pakistan has been 
stuck in the role of primary goods producer and has not seen the large spread of 
secondary and cumulative effects.  
 


















 Pakistan mainly imports refined petroleum (13%), crude petroleum (5.2%), 
palm oil (3.6%), petroleum gas (3.3%), and cars (2.4%). Its top imports are from China, 
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   China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the main investment project in 
Pakistan. It was valued at $62 billion in 201715 (Zhang, 2018). China intended to 
cooperate with Pakistan on energy, transportation and maritime access though CPEC. 
China-funded projects are 21 projects in energy, 8 projects in infrastructure, 12 
projects in port Gwadar, three projects in digital cable, four projects in rail-based mass 
transit, six projects in new provinces, nine projects in special economic zones and four 
projects in social development. An estimated $45 billion will be invested in 
transportation and oil pipeline connection between Kashgar (China) and Gwadar 
(Pakistan) (CPEC, 2019).  
 CPEC can increase the communication between China and Pakistan, which 
would endow Pakistan with a lower cost in order to be a station of entrepot trade. 
CPEC also serves as a new essential energy pipeline to China. The Strait of Malacca 
and the South China Sea comprise the current maritime line for imported energy to 
China. However, disputed islands in the South China Sea are causing uncertainties to 
the safety of China’s energy, which requires China to build a new energy trade road 
through CPEC. 
 Port Gwadar is the flagship in CPEC. It was involved in CPEC in February 
2014 after China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHC) repurchased the right 
of operation of Port Gwadar from PSA Singapore. PSA Singapore was the contractor 
and operator of Port Gwadar in 2007 (Authority G. P., 2019), but its operation did not 
generate sufficient profits. COPHC used a combination of port and free zones to 
attract businesses and investments. Several projects related to Port Gwadar have been 
 






agreed according to Gwadar Port Authority, in which a water supply system, power 
plant, and expressway will be built in Gwadar (Authority G. P., 2019). 80% of  
Construction funds were from China. China and Pakistan will receive 91% and 9% of 
profits respectively from operation of the port (Yiping, 2017). The profits of the free 
zone will be split into 15% for Pakistan and 85% for China.  
Port Gwadar was constructed under the “Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) 
model. The BOT model is an agreement on infrastructure between government and 
company. Within a concession agreement, the contractor company is responsible for 
investment, finance, construction, operation and maintenance. The contractor 
company can charge customers of the port operation fees for using the infrastructure 
during the agreed period; and local government has the right to supervise the operation 
of the infrastructure. After the agreed period, the contractor must return the 
infrastructure to local government with or without some compensation (Zhiku, 2019). 
BOT can effectively reduce government investment in infrastructure and ease its fiscal 
burden. Risks of government investment can also be eliminated by using the BOT 
model as the contractor is fully responsible for the project. China’s COPHC has the 
right of operation of Port Gwadar for 40 years (Authority G. P., 2019).    
Port Qasim Power Plant Project is one of the priority projects in CPEC. It 
started in May 2015 to resolve the problem of power shortage in Pakistan. Exim Bank 
of China is the fund provider, and the government of Pakistan provides a sovereign 
guarantee. This project is insured by overseas investment insurance of China Export 
and Credit Insurance Corporation. The total investment will be $2 billon in which 
74.6% is funded through borrowing. The project was built under “Building-Owning-
Operation” (BOO) model. Its contractor is jointly established by China’s Power 
Construction (51% of capital) and Qatar’s Al Mirqab Capital (49% of capital) 
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(Yidaiyilu, China's Power Construction Invested in Qsiam Power Plant in Pakistan, 
2019). China’s Power Construction is totally in charge of planning, designing, 
purchasing, construction and operation. The construction lasted 36 months in total. 
Like many other projects China invested overseas, the contractor will operate the 
Qasim Power Plant for 30 years. Qasim Power Plant has been in commercial operation 
since April 25, 2018 with the power price of $8.21, approved by Pakistan’s power 
regulatory authority.  
However, Pakistan’s government intended to reconsider some agreements in 
CPEC. Pakistan’s external debt increased from $96,735 million in the third quarter of 
2018 to $99,108 million in the fourth quarter of 2018 (Economics, 2019). CPEC 
contributed the majority to the debt increase. The Pakistan’s Finance Minister had to 
seek help from the IMF, which sent staff to Islamabad to discuss situations with local 
authorities trying to stabilize the economy. Besides, Pakistan also turned to Saudi 
Arabia and China for more funds16 (Aamir, 2019). Saudi Arabia signed a $20 billion 
investment package with Pakistan. Pakistan also approved issuing Panda bonds worth 
$1 billion in China for the first time (India, 2018). A Panda bond is Chinese currency 
RMB-dominated bond issued by non-Chinese issuers. Pakistan is also appealing to 
overseas Pakistanis to invest in diaspora bonds, which were launched by the 
government of Pakistan. Because of subdued expectations for economic growth and 
heightened external and fiscal risks, Standard & Poor downgraded Pakistan’s credit 











  The Maldives government owes $600 million directly to China and has been 
guaranteed another $935 million in loans. The total obligations are equal to one third 
of Maldives’ GDP. According to the Maldives Ministry of Finance, funds directly 
borrowed from China went to three sectors: airport expansion ($370 million), housing 
($160 million) and bridge construction ($65 million). Loans guaranteed by Maldives’ 
government went to five sectors: housing ($540 million), power infrastructure ($180 
million), Sun Siyam resort ($120 million), airport extension ($40 million) and road 
construction ($30 million). In “Fiscal and Debt Strategy” given by the Ministry of 
Finance and Treasury, Maldives’ rate of debt over GDP was 54.1% in 2015, and it 
will steadily grow to 64.9% in 2022. The rate of external debt over GDP was 18% in 
2016, 23% in 2017 and 28% in 2018. The average annual growth in external financing 
from 2014 to 2018 was 41%.   
  Maldives ranks as the 166th largest export economy in the world. It exported 
$309 million and imported $1.39 billion in 2017, which resulted a negative trade 
balance of $1.08 billion. Its top exports are petroleum gas (47%), fish fillets (20%) 
and non-fillet fresh fish (16%). As stated in the literature review, the volatile oil price 
can largely affect Maldives’ trade; and further change its capability of debt service. If 
we take into consideration the record low price of oil in March 2020, Maldives has to 
produce more barrels of oil to maintain its foreign exchange reserves. This challenge 
is similar to what Mexico faced during its debt crisis. In terms of Maldives’ exports, 















 Maldives imports industrial products involving refined petroleum (2.5%), 
broadcasting equipment (2.5%), furniture (2.1%), iron structure (1.8%) and insulated 
wire (1.7%). Its principal import countries are China, Singapore, India, and Malaysia. 
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  On September 18, 2018, a new runway of the international airport was put 
to operation. The construction was done by Beijing Urban Construction Group 
(BUCG) through the “Financing + Design and Construction” model. The Exim Bank 
of China was responsible for financing, and BUCG was responsible for design and 
construction. However, the problem of corruption might have led to the high cost of 
projects17 (Service, 2018). Former President Yameen Abdul Gayoom cancelled the 
original $500 million airport upgrade contract with India and paid $271 million in 
damages.  $200 million sovereign bond was raised by Yameen through a Chinese 
investment bank, Bocom. As a result, the contract was given to BUCG at the cost of 
$1 billion. Many projects signed by previous government are at an inflated price, 
according to the new government administration. The cost of a hospital built by a 
Chinese company at Male cost $140 million compared with anther rival’s $54 million 
(Reuters, 2018). The mismanagement of public assets is obvious in Maldives. Another 
state-owned Maldivian developer who was the contractor of $370 million public 
housing project was close to bankruptcy. Maldives’ government had to fund another 
$24 million to the project, which weakened the government’s ability to repay its 
external loan. Maldives is considered at high debt risk by the World Bank and the 
IMF. 
  However, given the fact that Maldives needs to develop its infrastructure, it 
has to renegotiate with China about lowering the repayment. Maldives cannot afford 
delaying any project, because it will increase unnecessary costs of repayments to its 
creditors. The average period of Maldives’ projects varies from 3 to 5 years. If any 
 
17 “New Maldives government to begin untangling secrete building deals with China amid warnings 





project in the BRI is extended, there will be more debt burdens on this country’s 
economy.  
 The debt of Maldives is sustainable according to its Medium-term Debt 
Strategy 2019-2021 in its Fiscal and Debt Strategy18 (Treasury, 2018). The strategy 
clearly states that “At the end of 2017, total public debt stood at MVR 43,785 million, 
equivalent to 61 percent of GDP, and 211 percent of total revenue.” The Maldives’ 
government is realizing the importance of developing a domestic debt market as of 
the debt service costs and risks in 2017. It will expand domestic debt market by 
introducing intermediate-term treasury instruments and by eliminating barriers to 
Maldives’ financial market. The estimated debt will be 20% higher than that of 2017 
at the end of the strategy period, but the rate of debt to GDP is expected to be lowered 
by 4.6% to 56.4% by the end of 2021. Among Maldives’ external debts in 2018, 56% 
of it is denominated in United States dollars (USD), 18% in Chinese yuan (CNY), and 
15% in Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The rest is denominated in Saudi riyal (SAR), 
Euro (EUR), Kuwaiti dinar (KWD), Japanese yen (JPY), and United Arab Emirates 
dirham (AED). The SDR is a form of currency maintained by IMF as a weighted 
average of major currencies (USD, EUR, CNY, JPY AND GBP at 41.73%, 30.39%, 
10.92%, 8.33% and 8.09% respectively). The Medium-term Debt Strategy also states 
that “With consideration to the external debt in the current pipeline and the 
government’s medium-term debt management strategy, it is expected that the CNY 
denominated debt will continue to lose share against the USD in the years of 2018 and 
2019.” The currency composition of Maldives’ external debt is as follows:  
 










   
  
 External debts are comprised of loans and grants from multilateral and 
bilateral agencies and financial institutions providing the buyer’s credit facility. A 
multilateral funding agency is established by a group of countries to help developing 
countries with financing. Maldives receives funds from the major multilateral 
agencies like the World Bank and the OPEC Fund for international development. 
Bilateral funding agencies are individual countries providing funds to countries who 
are in demand. Maldives’ bilateral funding agencies are the Saudi Fund for 
Development and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. The Exim Bank of China is 











short-term loan facility extended to an importer by an overseas lender such as a bank 
or financial institution to finance the purchase of capital goods, services and big-ticket 
items (Investopedia). Buyer’s credit provides relatively cheaper funds to importers 
compared to what may be available locally. There was a spike for Maldives’ buyer’s 
credit as well as for commercial loans from 2016. The multilateral funding has been 
kept to a relatively high level since 2008. In 2011, Maldives was removed from the 
list of Least Developed Countries who have more access to concessional funding. As 
a result, Maldives started its independent funding in the international market through 
bonds. A $250 million bond with a 7% fixed coupon and 5-year maturity was issued 
in the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2017; and another 5.5% fixed coupon with 5-year 
maturity was issued in the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange at the same time.  
  Sukuk is an Islamic bond that has gained popularity in recent years. Its 
method of repayment is similar to BRI loans in that both rely on the profits of the 
investment instead of  its yield. Sukuk is a “Sharia compliant” bond that pays back 
investors with profits (not interest) generated by the projects invested with Sukuk. 
Sukuk represents ownership of involving assets with an expiration date. If a property 
generates profits, then the investors of Sukuk can receive the profits until the date of 
expiration. According to Maldives’ Housing Development Finance Corporation, it 
issued 150,000 Sukuk with 10-year maturity in July 2017. The issue price was MVR 
1,000 per Sukuk for a total value of MVR 150 million. The target project was a 
mortgage housing, and 65% of total profits will go to the holders of Sukuk. Payment 
will be conducted every six months. There was $97.9 billion Sukuk issued in 2017, 




       3.2 Countries with “Healthy” Indebtedness  
Kenya 
  According to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 
there is an estimated $130 billion annual deficit in infrastructure investment. In 2016, 
overall financing for infrastructure in Africa amounted to $62.5 billion. Institutional 
investors, particularly pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, represent important 
sources of funds for this type of investment because of their relatively long-term 
investment horizons and their need to diversify and spread their risk19 (Barnor, 2018). 
But the investments of these funds have been very low. Most funds would like to 
invest in traditional low-risk government bonds, equity and treasury bills. According 
to the Bank of Botswana’s 2017 Annual Report, it is necessary to create more financial 
instruments that allow more liquid investment opportunities. Lack of prescriptive 
regulations also erodes the investment in infrastructure. Fund managers are not fully 
ware of bidding process of projects, which decreases the total amount of investment 
in infrastructure. 
  Kenya’s rate of debt to GDP is 58.97% according to Central Bank of Kenya 
in 2017. In its bilateral debt, China is the biggest creditor, holding $5.53 billion, 
followed by Japan with $1 billion as of June 2018. The portion of Chinese debt in 
total external debt is 20.76%. The multilateral debt of Kenya is $8.88 billion compared 
with $8.1 billion bilateral debt.   
 




  Kenya is the 101st largest export economy, with $6.17 billion exports and 
$17.1 billion imports in 2017. Its trade balance in 2017 was negative $11 billion. Its 
main exports are tea (22%), cut flowers (11%), refined petroleum (4.8%) and coffee 
(4.3%). The principal customers of Kenya are the US, Pakistan, Uganda and the 
Netherlands.  
  
The top imports of Kenya are refined petroleum (14%), palm oil (3.2%), cars 
(2.9%), packed medicaments (2.5%) and raw sugar (2.4%). Like other BRI members, 
Kenya’s top foreign goods supplier is China, followed by India, the United Arab 
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The Mombasa-Nairobi Railway is a 480-kilometer railway connecting the 
capital of Kenya, Nairobi, and its port, Mombasa. Construction began in 2014 and 
started operation on May 31, 2017. The railway was invested $3.8 billion in total. 90% 
of the investment is a loan offered by the Exim Bank of China, while 10% is funded 
by Kenya’s treasury. The contractor of the railway is China Road and Bridge 
Corporation (CRBC. The CRBC will operate the railway for 6 years after the 
construction is accomplished. This railway replaced the old Uganda Railway which 
was built in 1899. Mombasa-Nairobi railway is estimated to increase local GDP by 
1.5% and provides around 46,000 jobs. The cost of ground transportation in Kenya is 
about 45% of total cost of production, which directedly pushes up the price of middle 
and high-end goods. The new Mombasa-Nairobi railway can effectively lower the 
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cost of shipping. The cost of shipping a 20-foot container from China to Mombasa is 
$1,700, while the cost of ground transportation from Mombasa to Nairobi is $800.  
  Mombasa-Nairobi railway also generated high profits for Chinese 
contractors. 60% of the total cost of the project came from the operation cost of 
Chinese companies, including payment for Chinese workers and equipment, which 
means 60% of the total investment would contribute to the Chinese economy. 40% of 
the total cost went to compensation for land, payment to local workers and the 
purchase of concrete and steel. The 6-year operation, beginning in 2017, is predicted 
to generate large profits for the CRBC. The tickets from Nairobi to Mombasa cost $30 
for first-class and $10 for second-class (Kenya Railways). The cost of ground 
transportation of 1-ton goods in Kenya will decrease from $0.2 per mile to $0.08 per 
mile. Furthermore, the CRBC can still benefit from the operation of the railway 
because of the higher price of transportation in Kenya compared with $0.02 per mile 
in China. The annual throughput of Port Mombasa is 27 million tons, which creates 
high demand and potential surplus for the Mombasa-Nairobi railway and prevents the 
government from being stuck in debt to the railway.  
  Investments in the BRI address three thresholds of African development: 
backward infrastructure, lack of funds and shortage of human capital. Based on the 
experiences from past decades, the railways should be developed hand-in-hand with 
industrial parks and special economic zones, so that infrastructure and industrial 
development can reinforce one another. Thus, to stimulate industrial growth, the 
development of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway, Port Mombasa and the Mombasa 






  Uzbekistan is a landlocked country located in the center of the China-Central 
Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor20 (Qoraboyev, 2018). The Asian corridor extends 
through five Central Asian countries to Western Asian countries Iran and Turkey. As 
a pivot point of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is seeking to export its agricultural and 
mineral goods to foreign countries. As the 89th largest export economy, Uzbekistan 
had a negative trade balance of $2.84 billion in 2017; its export value was $8.38 billion 
and the import value was $11.2 billion. The primary exports of Uzbekistan are gold 
(44%), petroleum gas (8.3%), non-retail pure cotton yarn (7.1%), ethylene polymers 
(4.4%) and refined copper (3.7%). Uzbekistan’s main trade customers are Switzerland, 
China, Russia, Turkey and Kazakhstan.  
 
 
20 Qoraboyev, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Uzbekistan’s New Strategy of Development: 
Sustainability of mutual relevance and positive dynamics”, page 6, (2018). 
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Uzbekistan mainly imports vehicle parts (5.1%), packed medicaments (4.2%), 
refined petroleum (3.7%), coated flat-rolled iron (2.8%) and sawn wood (2%). Its 















  The BRI initiative echoes Uzbekistan’s new development strategy spanning 
years 2017-2021, the primary goal of which is to maintain macroeconomic stability 
and high economic growth. In May 2017 two countries signed 115 deals worth more 
than $23 billion to enhance their cooperation in electrical power, oil production, 
chemicals, architecture, textiles, pharmaceutical engineering, transportation, 
infrastructure and agriculture 21  (Eurasianet, 2017). China Railway Tunnel Group 
 
21 “Uzbekistan: President’s China Trip Yields Giant Rewards”, EurasiaNet, 16 May 2017 
https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-presidents-china-trip-yields-giant-rewards 
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(CRTG) is the contractor of two projects in Uzbekistan: Kamchiq Tunnel and the 
modernization of the Sharg’un coal mine. Before the construction of Kamchiq tunnel, 
trains running between Tashkent and Margilan needed to detour to Tajikistan. The 
19.2-kilometer long tunnel is the longest in Central Asia. It shortens the travel time 
from one hour to 15 minutes. Because of the project, 1,000 jobs were also created in 
the local economy (CCTV, One Belt One Road-Uzbekistan, 2019). The other project 
under construction by CRTG, the Sharg’un coal mine, meets 25% of Uzbekistan’s 
demand for coal. 25% of employees were hired locally. Many locals used to work in 
Russia, but now the Sharg’un project saves them the trip and provides employment 
opportunities that pay around $142 per month. 2021 is the estimated time start time 
for the Sharg’un mine project, which will create 6,000 jobs. The Sharg’un mine is 
currently operated by Sharg’un Coal Mine Co., Ltd (CCTV, One Belt One Road-
Uzbekistan, 2019). 
  The railway is the most important mode of transportation in Uzbekistan, but 
most trains are internal combustion locomotives inherited from the Soviet Union. 
China National Technical Import and Export Corporation (CNTIC) conducted 
electrification reform for 550 kilometers of local railways. The speed of trains can 
increase from 80km/hr to 160 km/hr. Uzbekistan imported electric locomotives from 
CNTIC in 2013 because of the upgrade of the railway (CCTV, One Belt One Road-
Uzbekistan, 2019). BRI not only enables massive infrastructure promotion by state-
owned companies, but also introduces investment from private companies. Like many 
BRI countries, Uzbekistan has many favorable policies for foreign companies who 
invest in the country. The government offered a private Chinese company, Jin Sheng, 
839 acres free land to build an industrial park (Yidaiyilu, Uzbekistan Peng Sheng 
Industrial Park, 2017). Jin Sheng is a private company based in Zhejiang province 
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where Alibaba Group comes from. The total investment was $90 million, covering 
businesses distributing products such as tiles, leather, shoes, cellphones, faucets, pet 
food, etc. The industrial park provided around 1,300 job opportunities. A total of 16 
Chinese companies in the park contributed $2.21 million in taxes, which accounted 
for 25% of total tax revenue in the Sirdaryo region. Local workers in the industrial 
park are paid about $142 per month. Take tile production as an example of the impact 
of the industrial park: residents in the Sirdaryo region tended previously to install 
carpet floors in their homes, but since the increase of local tile production, tile has 
become more popular in local construction materials as it is more available and is 
easier to clean. The price of tile has also been reduced by 40% since 2009. 
Modernization of agriculture was also on the investment list of the industrial park. 
Cotton has been a major commercial crop in Uzbekistan, but the traditional cultivation 
method did not help its modernization. As a result, drip irrigation and membrane 
technology were introduced from China as a stepping stone to increase production and 
reduce utilization of water. Local peasants’ monthly income is around $120. By 
working in a cotton test field, they can earn extra $10 a day.   
  The growth of Uzbekistan’s external debt was kept at a constant rate and the 
structure of the debt was optimizing. Uzbekistan’s external debt was $17.3 billion in 
2018 according to Central Bank of The Republic of Uzbekistan. Beginning in 2017, 
its government external debt increased at an accelerated rate due to financing state 
development programs, and this trend will continue in the coming years39 (Uzbekistan, 
2018). The total external debt increased by 9.5% ($1.5 billion) in January 2019 
compared with the beginning of 2018. Although the private external debt decreased 
by $977 million in 2019 from the 2018 amount, the public external debt increased by 
58% ($2.4 billion). 88.6% of external debt has maturity of more than 10 years; only 
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0.8% has one-year maturity. The long maturity of debt represents a low default risk 
and provides the government more time to focus on spurring its economic growth. 
Additionally, the principal debt payments and interest payments made by the 
government was much lower than the forecast given by the central bank; the principal 
payment will decrease from $1.3 billion in 2019 to $199.5 million after 2026. The 
interest payment will also drop from $331.6 million to $28.8 million after 2026. In 
next 5 years, the burden of repayment will be gradually alleviated for Uzbekistan’s 



















  Among Uzbekistan’s trade partners, China and Russia are the main players. 
Uzbekistan effectively diversified its imports by having more trade partners. Although 
imports from China increased by 30% in 2018, China’s share in total volume has 
decreased due to the increase in imports from other countries. The share of imports 
from Japan and Korea jumped by 3.5% and 1.5%, respectively. Machinery and 
equipment were the major imports in last three years. For imports of services, the 






countries are Switzerland, China and Russia. In 2018, around 30% of exports went to 
Switzerland, 20% went to China and 15% went to Russia. Gold is Uzbekistan’s most 
popular export at 25.5% of total exports. Oil and gas products occupy 23.3% of that 
total. Uzbekistan’s current account went from surplus ($1.5 billion) to deficit ($-3.5 
billion) in 2018 due to the implementation of regional development and capital 
construction programs, increasing external borrowing and repayment of direct 
investment obligations22 (Uzbekistan, 2018). Its current account deficit is 7% of its 
GDP. The 46% increase in imports in 2018 contributed most to the deficit. Because 
of the government’s active lending policy, more foreign goods are needed to support 
its domestic construction. Despite of the deteriorating current account, reinvestment 
of earnings by foreign companies increased 46% in 2018. The amount of Uzbekistan’s 
exports was also kept constant with an increase of 21% in 2017 and 28% in 2018. The 
net portfolio investment by foreign investors in 2018 also increased over 300% from 
2017. The steady inflow of capital is a sign of strong confidence of foreign investors 
in Uzbekistan’s future economy. It also provides sufficient capital for its further 
economic development.
 
22 “Balance of Payments, International Investment Position and External Debt of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan”, 2018, page 11. 
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4. Comparations and Analysis: Is History Repeating Itself? 
       4.1 Mexico’s Debt Crisis in 1982 
Although the oil price change provoked Mexico’s debt crisis in 1982, the 
underlying factors stemmed from Mexico’s huge public sector; from massive state 
intervention into the economy, and from restrictive trade and investment policies23 
(Hudgins, 1986). The government consumed about 26% of Mexico’s GNP in 1970 
and 50% in 1986 (Luis, 1986). To increase employment in public sector, the number 
of state-owned enterprises jumped from 86 in 1970 to over 1,000 in 1986. The 
compensation of public-sector employees was 7% of Mexico’s GDP in 1982 (Carlos 
Cantu, 2015). Mexico’s economic policy did not help the country in realizing 
economic growth, which is the key element for debt repayment. The public sector in 
Mexico’s economy was not helpful for improving production efficiency, especially in 
manufacturing. The low efficiency of manufacturing is well demonstrated in the low 
percentage of the country’s exported goods, which in 1982 was 24%. The greatest rest 
value of Mexico’s exports came from oil.  
  Capital flight also worsened Mexico’s debt crisis. Mexico’s peso was 
overvalued before the crisis, which concerned foreign capitalists about its devaluation. 
Mexico’s inflation rate was over 20% from 1978 to 1980, while its exchange rate was 
kept constant. When inflation happens in a country, the demand for its goods and 
currency will decrease due to higher prices within the country. The country’s citizens 
 
23 Hudgins, “A US Strategy to Solve Mexico’s Debt Crisis”, 1986. 
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tend to purchase goods from other countries whose prices are lower, which leads to 
the increase of the currency supply in international market. Investors’ perceptions— 
the ultimate determination of a currency’s value and exchange rate—of the peso were 
influenced chiefly by Mexico’s overvaluation of the currency. From 1980 to early 
1982, the peso depreciated by 16% while Mexico’s inflation was 30%. The real 
exchange rate appreciated. The real exchange rate is the product of the nominal 
exchange rate and the ratio of prices between two countries. If the ratio of prices 
increases, the real exchange rate appreciates. Mexico’s real interest rate became 
negative, which seduced debtors to borrow more. By June 1982, the peso had 
depreciated by about 50%. In 1981 and 1982, capital flight was estimated at 
respectively 3.4% and 4.2% of Mexico’s GDP (Brinke, 2013). Nationalization of 
Mexico’s banks in 1982 also accelerated foreign capital outflow. 
       4.2 Comparations 
  The following chart compares current situations of debtors in the BRI to 
Mexico’s debt crisis in 1982. The data of Mexico in the chart below is from the year 
1982, while the other three countries’ data is the most updated information. Given the 
reasons of Mexico’s debt crisis, four types of data are demonstrated: ratio of 
government debt over GDP, ratio of current account over GDP, ratio of government 



















(1982) 60% 2% -17.60% -0.60% 
 
n/a 
Djibouti 90.70% -26% -4.40% 4.10% 
 
High 
Pakistan 72.50% -23.70% -6.60% 5.70% 
 
High 









Debt to GDP measures a country’s ability to carry the debt in relation to its 
annual productive capability (Appleyard & Field, 2017). For developing and emerging 
economies, 40% is the suggested debt-to-GDP ratio that should not be breached on a 
long-term basis (Chowdhury & Islam, 2010). The optimal rate of debt for advanced 
economies is 60%. Countries are offered these benchmarks to maintain their debt 
sustainable in an April 2010 report by the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF. The 
IMF puts efforts into its fiscal policy to smooth out business cycles in the short run 
and meet targets for debt sustainability in the long run.   
In terms of the scale of government debt, Pakistan and Djibouti have a higher 
ratio of debt over GDP in comparison to Mexico. Maldives has relatively lower rate 
of debt. Like the booming economy of Mexico prior to 1982, Pakistan and Djibouti 
were both experiencing fiscal expansion as of BRI projects. Theoretically all three 
countries (Mexico, Djibouti and Pakistan) are over the reasonable debt level. However, 
there are currently many countries with high debt ratios in the world, and they are not 
in debt crisis due to this high level of debt. The benchmarks are not an optimal rate, 






Source: Central Bank of Djibouti, State Bank of Pakistan, Maldives 
Monetary Authority, voxeu.org, and tradingeconomics.com 
Figure 14 
 
Tabl  11 
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but merely a median ratio. The IMF uses the word “useful” to describe the benchmarks, 
but does not explain their basis. The authors of the IMF report, “Assessing 
Sustainability” (IMF 2002), explain the benchmarks thusly: “It bears emphasizing that 
a debt ratio over 40 percent of GDP by no means necessarily implies a crisis. There is 
an 80 percent probability of not having a crisis even when the debt ratio exceeds 40 
percent of GDP” (Chowdhury & Islam, 2010). A high debt level does not necessarily 
imply debt crisis, but a country with high debt is relatively less capable to absorb 
external shocks. It is assumed that when the debt gets very large, it may be difficult to 
generate a primary balance that is sufficient to ensure sustainability, and external 
shocks can push countries beyond their debt limit. Mexico was negatively affected by 
the oil price fall in 1982, which directly jeopardized the country’s debt sustainability. 
If any external shock strikes Djibouti or Pakistan, they are more likely to be exposed 
to the risk of bankruptcy. 
  However, it is a weak argument that Djibouti and Pakistan will be in debt 
crisis if we assess solely their high level of debt. According to Universal 
Generalization in Discrete Mathematics, if any high debt country is vulnerable when 
facing external shocks, then all countries with high ratios of debt over GDP are 
vulnerable to external shocks in comparison to countries with sustainable debt. 
Apparently, it is not the case that all countries with high debt in the world are exposed 
to external shocks, because there are many other financial vehicles used by sovereign  
governments to protect their financial security. People tend to have a preoccupation 
that a ratio of high public debt to GDP has a negative impact on economic growth. 
But it is not uncommon that fiscal policy is ignored in promoting economic growth. 
It is out of prudence that countries are advised to keep their debt ratio below the 
benchmarks. In reality, very few countries can keep to the prudence of this 
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recommendation. Again, the question of high debt falls on whether the debt will 
contribute to economic growth in the long run. As economist Evsey Domar points out, 
“The problem of the burden of debt is essentially a problem of achieving a growing 
national income.”  








Investopedia gives the definition of “current account” as that which “records  
a nation’s transactions with the rest of the world—specifically its net trade in goods 
and services, its net earnings on cross-border investments, and its net transfer 
payments—over a defined period of time, such as a year or a quarter.” From the chart 
above, we can see that Mexico performed much better in its current account than the 
three other countries. Mexico’s current account had a surplus in 1982, while the others 
are all in deficit. The current account deficit is not helpful for their debt repayment. 
Unless Maldives and Djibouti have other sources of income for debt repayment, the 
high ratio of current account deficit to GDP will not bring more foreign exchange for 
debt services. The direct reason of Mexico’s insolvency in 1982 was the falling price 
of oil, which decreased the surplus of the current account. If we assume that Mexico 










was losing points in its international trade in 1982, then all other three BRI countries 
already lost the game of trade. The long period of current account deficit will add 
more burdens for debtors. 
  Maldives’ current account to GDP has been in deficit since 2000, and it 
averaged -14.12% from 1997 to 2018 according to the Maldives Monetary Authority. 
Pakistan’s current account to GDP averaged -2.35% from 1980 to 2018; the number 
for Djibouti was -8.89% from 1991 to 2018. Before Mexico’s debt crisis in 1982, the 
current account had been deteriorating steadily for several years. Similar scenarios are 
happening to the three BRI countries above, which can hint at coming debt crises. 
Take Pakistan as an example: its current account deficit has hit a record high of $18 
billion, which indicates a roughly $1.5 billion monthly loss for foreign exchange 
reserves. Pakistan has $13.5 billion of foreign exchange reserves of which $7 billion 
are held by the State Bank of Pakistan and the rest is with commercial banks. If the 
current account deficit lasts for another one or two years, Pakistan will face a reserve 
so low that it will be a difficult time for the government to repay its external debt. 
Mexico had the exact same problem in 1982, and unsuccessfully attempted to raise 
foreign exchange reserves by devaluating the peso. The government of Pakistan is 
negotiating with the IMF and is trying to increase its reserves. The coincidence should 
be alarming to Pakistan given the experience of Mexico in the 1980s.  
  In the case of Maldives, its current account deficit increased because of 
subdued exports and rapid growth of imports linked to investment projects. In 2015, 
Maldives’ current account deficit was 7.4% according to the data of Maldives 
Monetary Authority, but it rocketed to 23.5% in 2016. Maldives’s current account 
balance deteriorated 541% from 2013 to 2018. Decades-long deficit will not help their 
debt services, especially during these years when debt is piled up quickly. 
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 One primary difference between Mexico and the other three countries is that, 
prior to the debt crisis, the Mexican government controlled 900 of the country’s 
businesses, including aviation and steel companies. In 1980, 1,155 state-owned 
enterprises contributed 10.5% of the GDP, 3.9% of total employment and 26.7% of 
the gross capital formation. In 1982, Mexico nationalized all private banks. As a result, 
more than 100 businesses would be controlled or partially controlled by the 
government, which was responsible for 35% of private industry. One would see the 
government’s presence in petrochemicals, hotels, real estate, mining and even food 
production. Mexico owned 66% of shares of the world’s largest silver mine, Real de 
Angeles. Due to restricted policies, all of these government-owned enterprises had 
very limited access to foreign investment. To gain funds for these enterprises, 
Mexico’s government had to raise funds on its own through borrowing. Unprofitable 
state-owned companies also presented a barrier to the government’s ability to repay 
debt. Nationalization of private banks led to the outflow of foreign capital and 
unprotected private property due to a loss of trust in the Mexican government. Fleeing 











foreign capital rubbed salt into Mexico’s debt wounds. There was no additional capital 
Mexico could borrow for its debt service. The large size of the public sector directly 
contributed to the government budget deficit in Mexico.  
  The three BRI countries’ government budget deficits are in reasonable scale 
compared with that of Mexico in 1982. Since most BRI projects are in the public 
sector, some data of the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is gathered. 
According to Pakistan’s Federal Footprint of the 2013-2014 fiscal year, it had a total 
of 190 SOEs with around $1.37 billion net profit. Among the 190 state-owned entities, 
there were 175 public sector companies, 8 development finance institutions and 7 
federal authorities. In the energy sector, the changes from the last period to the next 
in net profits of hydrocarbon and power were 29.5% and -39.3%, respectively. The 
financial sector had a 68.6% net profit increase; the industrial and engineering sector 
had a 4.8% net profit decrease. The transportation sector experienced a 22.5% net 
profit loss. The general condition of Pakistan’s public sector was profitable in the 
fiscal year of 2013-2014, although net profit loss happened in some sectors, i.e., 
energy and transportation. 
  A Maldives’ Summary of Quarterly Review for the first quarter of 2018 
showed SOEs are generally in good condition. 12 out of 19 SOEs who comprise a 
great portion of the economy had an increase in revenue from the first quarter of 2017. 
Out of these 19 major SOEs, 10 SOEs’ gross profits increased over 10% in 2018 from 
the same period of 2017. 5 SOEs had over 60% gross profit loss. 12 companies’ 
liquidity ratios were over 1, which means they are capable of covering their short-
term debt. Better performance of SOEs in Pakistan and Maldives endows the 
governments with stronger capability to repay their debt. Compared with SOEs in 
Mexico, Pakistan and Maldives do not have many unprofitable public enterprises. As 
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a result, public enterprises will not crowd out government’s spending on other projects 
to maintain the running of public facilities. A relatively low government budget deficit 
in three BRI countries does not give us a sign of debt crisis as that which happened in 





















       4.2.4 GDP Growth Rate 
 







   
  Mexico’s economy was prosperous prior to the debt crisis. From the mid-
1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, the average annual economic growth was 7%, 
and the inflation rate was never exceeded. Its GDP growth rate even reached to 9.7% 
in 1979. As an oil exporter, Mexico benefited from its oil reserves. But its other 
exports were negatively influenced as the world economy stepped into recession in 
1979. The decades-long prosperity was washed off by the recession, which led to 
negative economic growth upon the debt crisis. In the cases of the three BRI countries, 
all have had long periods of constant growth with slight differences. According to the 
data of the World Bank, the GDP growth rates of Pakistan and Maldives wandered 
within the range of 2% to 8% in the past ten years; Djibouti’s GDP growth rate jumped 
to 9.7% in 2015 and dropped down to 4.1% in 2017. The estimated GDP growth rate 
for Djibouti will be 7.3% in 2019 and 7.5% in 2020. Pakistan is also expected a better 
economy with 3.7% in 2019 and 4.2% in 2020. Maldives might face a slowing down 
economy with 6.3% of GDP growth rate in 2019 and 5.6% in 2020. Given the growth 
volatility of these countries, they are having a relative high growth compared with the 











debt-buried Mexico of 1982. If we take inflation into account, Djibouti’s inflation rate 
will be 0.8% in 2019 and 1.2% in 2020 (IMF). In 2019, Pakistan and Maldives will 
each have an inflation rate of 2.9% and a 2.2%, respectively. The low inflation rate is 
different from Mexico’s experience, where in 1981 the rate of inflation was 27%. The 
inflation rate of Mexico grew progressively out of control, rising to 101.8% in 1983 
and 132% in 1987. If we assess debt risks from GDP growth rate, the economic 
conditions of these three BRI countries are in much better positions than that of 
Mexico in the 80s. 
  The differences between GDP growth rates of the three BRI countries and 
Mexico lie in the structural differences in their national economies. Mexico’s 
industries were protected by its trade policies, and import quotas covered 100% non-
oil production before debt crisis24 (Brinke, 2013). Foreign investment was not allowed 
to come into Mexico freely. The economy of Mexico in 1982 was not as open as the 
three BRI countries above, which is understandable given the different time periods 
and global relationships. Liberalization of the economy was a goal of Mexico’s, and 
it joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) shortly after the debt 
crisis. From then on, Mexico began to raise more liberal policies on trade and foreign 
investment. All these actions taken by the Mexican government were to ease past 
restrictions on the economy. On the other hand, the three BRI economies welcome 
foreign investments. They are more involved in international economy compared with 
Mexico in the past. The openness provides more alternatives to foreign loans and more 
solutions to debt services. When a relatively open economy repays its debt, it can use 
the funds not only from domestic revenue but also from bridge funds from foreign 
 




countries. While an open economy can use a variety resources to realize economic 
growth, the only way for Mexico to maintain foreign funds was by continuing to 
borrow loans. 
            4.3 Other Similarities 
  Djibouti and Pakistan have some other symptoms that can also be found in 
Mexico’s debt crisis. First, these countries have experienced or are facing debt-for-
equity swap. In Mexico’s debt crisis, the foreign banks sold portions of their debts to 
foreign companies who could exchange the loans for government-owned equity 
(Hudgins, 1986). Debt for equity swaps also happened in one of the BRI participants, 
Sri Lanka, which leased the Port of Hambantota to China for 99 years because it was 
not able to repay its debt. China has a military base in Djibouti now, and is operating 
Gwadar Port in Pakistan. It is possible for Pakistan to repay its debt by equity if it has 
difficulties in servicing its debt (Mourdoukoutas, 2018). In November 2018, 
Pakistan’s Minister of Finance said the country’s financial gap stood at $12 billion. 
Pakistan is seeking financial help from China, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
and the IMF. Second, Pakistan is also experiencing declining foreign exchange 
reserves like Mexico was in 1982. According to data from Trading Economics, 
Pakistan’s foreign reserve reached a peak in late 2016 and has been falling since then. 
Pakistan’s central bank said its foreign exchange reserves stood at $18.2 billion, not 
enough to cover imports for two months (Aamir, 2019). A drying foreign exchange 
reserve also triggered Mexico’s debt crisis in 1982. This is why Pakistan is so eager 




       4.4 Are BRI Members Repeating History?   
  At the beginning of China’s Reform and Opening Up, Japan offered 
tremendous technology support and low or no-interest loans. Japan exported 
equipment in sets and construction machineries to China; China exported raw 
materials like oil and coal to Japan. The loans to China are not tied with any 
requirement. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to China started in 1979. A total amount of 3.3 
trillion yen of loan aid, 157.2 billion yen of grant aid and 181.7 billion yen of technical 
cooperation have been supplied to China. The ODA projects were mostly 
infrastructure such as roads, airports, power stations and assistances in medical and 
environmental sectors. A total of 5,200 km of railway have been electrified. China 
Baowu Steel Group, with an annual production of 3 million tons, was built by 
Japanese Nippon Steel. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) accepted a 
total of 35,000 Chinese trainees for industrial promotion and dispatched 9,027 experts 
to China.  
  However, the cooperation between these two nations, who have a 
complicated history, did not go smoothly. China suddenly suspended the Baowu Steel 
project, labeling it a fiscal deficit, claiming it would cause inflation and lead to the 
dissatisfaction of Chinese citizens. Large investments were pushing China, who had 
few foreign currency reserves, into piles of debt. The Chinese leader then, Xiaoping 
Deng, said that “China is uncapable and advancing rashly.” There were worries of 
Japanese colonialism bought with low-interest loans. Another Chinese leader, Mu Gu, 
was called “traitor” by his mother. The Chinese government invited a Japanese 
economist, Saburo Okita, to advise Chinese development. Okita advised that China 
should not solve current problems at the cost of future development. If Japanese 
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projects were canceled, there would be permanent jeopardies on the China-Japan 
relationship. China would face negative effects on credits at the same time. With 
another 300-billion-yen in financing, all projects resumed.  
  The BRI countries fall in the same position that China was in during their 
Reform and Opening Up. Anxiety caused by large external debts is testing the host 
countries as it did China. These countries can remain in their current situations without 
external debts, or they can improve their economies with external debts. It is not 
practical for non-Western, less-developed countries to incubate their economic 
development by relying solely on internal resources. The centered countries are 
adopting peripheral countries into the global supply chain and extracting surpluses 
from them. The peripheral countries are providing raw materials and products with 
low surpluses to developed economies. If these less developed countries cannot 
improve their infrastructure and realize industrialization, they will be trapped in their 
subordinate positions for a longer period than they might otherwise.  
The initiation of Chinese Reform and Opening Up starting in 1979 can be 
viewed as an example of industrialization in a broken economy. There were severe 
debates about whether to have the Reform and Opening Up in China in the 1980s, 
given the fear of fading socialism in the country. Deng Xiaoping recommended, “We 
should free our minds and be realistic.” When asked if China was still following 
socialism during the Reform and Opening Up, he explained that the Chinese economy 
was using a “cat story”; a capable cat catches rats, no matter the color of the rats. Deng 
also pointed out that Chinese socialism was not equal to poverty. For a country that 
underwent a ten-year economic turmoil during the Cultural Revolution, Deng’s 
leadership vitally changed the Chinese economy and the life of ordinary Chinese 
people. In the past 40 years, 800 million Chinese people were raised out of poverty, 
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and the country has been among the fastest-growing economies in the world. There 
have not been many opportunities for China to develop its economy after the Qing 
dynasty, and Deng Xiaoping seized the opportunity of Reform and Opening Up. 
Nowadays, there are both opportunities and risks in the BRI infrastructure projects. 
The immediate benefit will be the improvement of local industrialization and peoples’ 
livelihoods. It will be a start for peripheral countries to be industrialized and to 
upgrade their industries. But the debt problem that comes with external investments 
can tunnel the country’s economy if there is no reasonable debt scheduling. Host 




5. Discussion of Findings 
5.1 Why BRI? 
When we talk about the debt level of countries participating in BRI, the ratio 
of government debt to GDP is often cited. According to the following chart in which 
countries with high ratios of debt level are listed, Japan is leading the countries, with 
the highest government debt to GDP of 253%. In the top 10 countries, there are 6 
high-income countries. In the top 20 countries, there are 11 high-income countries. 
These high-income countries have a relatively lower default risk even if their debt 
level is high. The higher production and high value-added products bring more 
benefits to high-income countries than to low-income countries. Cash flow can be 
generated continuously to repay the public debt, and the better credit rating can also 
help these high-income countries to borrow more debts as needed.
 Country List Government Debt to GDP 
 (tradingeconomics.com as Dec 2017) 
 Country      %  Country    % 
1 Japan 253.00 15 Cyprus 97.50 
2 Greece 178.60 16 France 97.00 
3 Lebanon 152.00 17 Jordan 95.85 
4 Italy 132.10 18 Djibouti 90.70 
5 Portugal 125.70 19 Bahrain 90.60 
6 Cape Verde 125.30 20 Canada 89.60 
7 Congo 117.70 21 Mozambique 88.20 
8 Singapore 110.60 22 Sao Tome and Principe 87.50 
9 Bhutan 108.64 23 Euro Area 86.70 
10 United States 105.40 24 United Kingdom 84.70 
11 Jamaica 103.30 25 Yemen 83.50 
12 Belgium 103.10 26 European Union 81.60 
13 Egypt 101.20 27 Mongolia 79.40 
14 Spain 98.30 28 Austria 78.40 
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 A country like Djibouti has no manufacturing base or the necessary 
infrastructure for economic development. Still, Djibouti ranked the 18th among 
countries in heavy debt. Do they really need to borrow a large amount of external debt 
for development? How do these developing countries repay their debt? 
  An independent sovereign country has enough intelligence to plan its own 
route of development. When a country makes its fiscal plan, the demand for funding 
should be carefully considered. If factories in a country do not have enough electric 
power to produce, then clearly this country needs to build more power plants. 
However, a country should carefully assess the demand for further construction of 
power plants if it already has the necessary infrastructure. For example, it takes five 
to seven days for goods from Ethiopia to be transported to Djibouti by trucks. The 
railway connected Addis Ababa and Djibouti can shorten the shipping time to 15 
hours. The old railway between these two countries was built by the French in 1897, 
so the decision of building an Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway is reasonable. Take 
Malaysia as another example: it cancelled three out of six BRI projects as of high-
level debts. Given Malaysia has over five times GDP per capital than Djibouti, 
Malaysia is not as desperate as Djibouti to have infrastructure for transportation. It is 
the country’s free will to participate in BRI projects.   
  Servicing external loans is a global issue. In recent years it has become 
painfully clear that nonfulfillment of the contractual terms of international debt as 
originally agreed upon can spread beyond the immediate debtors and creditors so as 
to disrupt international trade and the international banking system25 (James Barth, 
1987). Countries participating in the BRI are mostly low-productive countries, and 
 




BRI projects are mostly infrastructure that will take a long time to be break even. If 
these projects cannot help in achieving economic growth, then the debtors cannot 
repay the debt in time. Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Djibouti all experienced hardship of 
repayment and they had to either borrow more to cover the original debts or go the 
path of debt-for-equity. 
BRI is not only lending loans to other developing countries for development 
of infrastructure, but also sending its excess productivity and technology to gain 
Chinese companies more contracts. Financing is one link of the whole BRI chain. As 
the first reason of BRI, China’s excess productive capacities cannot be eliminated 
overnight. When it is not economically reasonable to building more bridges and high-
speed railways domestically, there is still great demand for them in the international 
market. Therefore Chinese construction companies often go overseas, hand-in-hand 
with Chinese capital. Prior to BRI, China had been providing tied aid to other 
countries. China foreign aid is directed towards infrastructure development, requiring 
50% of the construction contracts be awarded to Chinese contractors and 50% of the 
materials be produced by Chinese business26 (Kjollesdal & Welle-Strand, 2010). BRI 
projects are business investments with loans instead of financial aid. All loans play a 
role of assistance to BRI projects constructed by Chinese contractors. Furthermore, 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established in 2016 to solve 
deficiency of capital for improving infrastructure. By December 2018, the AIIB had 
gained 93 members.  
  For many Chinese construction companies, financial institutions and 
insurance companies, BRI is not a risk-free program. Many projects bind construction 
 




and operation together to prevent immediate default after construction. From railways 
to hydropower stations, Chinese contractors’ operations might make some benefits 
and relieve financial burdens for local governments. The more important issue is that 
most projects are insured by the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation. If 
one recipient defaults on investment, the negative shock will spread through the 
financial system to whoever are involved in overseas investments. The Export-Import 
Bank of China, the sovereign country, the construction companies and the China 
Export and Credit Insurance Corporation will all face severe default risks. The BRI 
will confront a financial crisis, which happened in 2008. Given all connections with 
all sovereign countries joined in the BRI, these Chinese companies are too big to fail. 
But the loss will be tremendous for China and other countries involved.      
  In terms of countries with “unhealthy” indebtedness, the three BRI countries 
examined here share some similarities with Mexico. However, these similarities are 
not sufficient to trigger a debt crisis. Although the three BRI countries possess the 
worst ratio of current account over GDP, the better performance of economies is the 
fundamental element that can provide cash flows to service their external debts. It is 
possible that these three countries have learned from the Mexico’s debt crisis; that 
their economic policies are more liberal and more prepared for external shocks. In 
addition, there are more alternative methods to solve the liquidity problem nowadays. 
Three BRI countries are striving to seek alternatives when there is a sign of illiquidity; 
more options of bilateral and multilateral borrowing can decrease their illiquidity risk. 
Finally, China tends to avoid BRI members’ illiquidity in the name of the success and 
reputation of its first global strategy. Chinese SOEs are also flexible in the 
renegotiation of repayment to ensure the accomplishment of the BRI.  
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       5.2 If Repayments Well Arranged 
  If China and BRI participating countries arrange the loan repayments well, 
do we still consider BRI a debt trap? The outcomes of debt renegotiations between 
China and borrowers are deferment, forgiveness, refinancing and asset seize27 (Kratz, 
Feng, & Wright, 2019). Given the total debts to a country, a very limited amount of 
debts, ranging from $5 million to $160 million, were written off. Sudan’s $160 million 
debt, which is 2.5% of total debt owed to China, was written off, according to the data 
of China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins. However, the forgiveness did 
not really help in easing the borrowers’ debt burdens. The debts written off are 
commonly accompanied by new lending. When Botswana’s $7 million was forgiven 
in 2017, a new $1 billion worth of infrastructure was alleged by China. 
  An official of the China Railway No.2 Group signaled debt-for-equity when 
he was asked about the default of Djibouti on Addis-Ababa-Djibouti Railway. China 
Railway No.2 Group can operate businesses on Djibouti’s land if the government of 
Djibouti cannot make payments on time. This method will certainly diminish some 
obligations of the local government, but it might spur objections of residents if 
Djibouti’s government does not properly arrange relocated households. The similar 
problem already happened in the construction of a hydropower station in Myanmar. 
Residents protested against unjust compensation during removal for new construction.    
  Another method of avoiding default is commodity-backed loans. How does 
the repayment of a commodity-backed loan work (Collins, 2019)? Take Venezuela’s 
oil-backed loans as an example: China Development Bank (CDB) lends to Venezuela; 
 





Venezuela’s oil company Petroleos de Venezuela sells oil to Chinese oil companies 
at prevailing market price. Then Chinese oil companies sell the oil and send the 
income to CDB, which will maintain the funds needed for the loan services. During 
the process, one risk involved is whether or not the market price prevails; because oil 
is pledged for the loan at a fixed price, if the price of oil decreases, Venezuela has to 
produce more barrels of oil to service the debt. The volatile commodity price is an 
unstable factor in commodity-backed loans. In the case of Venezuela, there was a 
grace period from 2016 to April 2018, which allowed the Venezuelan government to 
pay back only the interest of the loan. African countries also have taken commodity-
backed loans from China, as China used to repay Japan with crude oil and coal in 
compensatory trade. Through this mutual benefit loan, China has issued $28.8 billion 
in commodity-backed loans. Angola repaid 127 public projects with four oil lines to 
China Eximbank. Ghana repaid the loan for Bui Dam with cocoa beans; Ethiopia used 
its sesame seeds. Kenya repaid the railway loan with its revenue from the railway. 
These natural resources are highly demanded in China these years, which can prevent 
debtors’ default. However, these commodity-backed loans are causing the concern 
that China is plundering raw materials from its debtors or exploiting benefits overseas 
for its multinational companies.  
  Third, contracts with BRI countries usually ensure Chinese construction 
companies and financial services will be involved in those countries’ businesses. It is 
not uncommon to see Chinese companies operating trains in host countries. If a host 
country cannot fulfill its obligations, extension of operation can be discussed in their 
renegotiation. However, it (tied loan) restricts international competition in the projects 
and programs financed in this way and may mean that because of higher prices the 
potential real transfer of resources to the developing country will be lower and the 
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growth effects smaller28 (Holthus & Kebschull, 1985). Most BRI countries lack the 
technology necessary for infrastructure construction; the model of “build + operation” 
attached in loans exclude technologies from countries other than China. When 
Maldives cancelled the airport upgrade project with India and resigned a new contract 
with China in a tied loan, the tied loans limited Maldives’ options of contractors only 
to Chinese companies. Other companies who might maintain better technologies or 
lower cost cannot compete with Chinese companies fairly. The problem of corruption 
related to tied loans was also addressed by the newly elected Maldives government. 
On the other hand, the tied loans effectively increased exports of China and 
established Chinese political influence in the recipient countries. Jobs related to 
exports can also be secured in China. It gives China more time to gradually diminish 
excess production capability and improve its industrial structure. Not only 
construction but other industries are impacted by the tied loans. More low-value added 
industries are being moved to trade-free zones in other countries where cost of labor 
is lower than in China. A Chinese shoemaker, Huajian, is now the biggest private 
company in Ethiopia. It hires over 7,500 people and contributes exports worth over 
$122 million to Ethiopia.  
  In the beginning of the 1980s, countries like France and the UK heavily 
attached their own interests to bilateral aid. The greater weight attached to a country’s 
own interest is reflected in the increasing concentration on bilateral aid, which the 
donor country can influence (Holthus & Kebschull, 1985). Because of low efficiency 
and politicization of multilateral funding, tied aid normally happens in bilateral aid. 
Prior to the bilateral cooperation between some countries in Africa and China, the 
 




borrowers borrowed multilaterally from Western banks29 (Bavier & Shepherd, 2018). 
Djibouti borrowed $268 million from seven banks at 9% over nine years, but its first 
Chinese loan was $620 million over 20 years at 2.85%. Some countries turned to the 
capital market, which also has a relatively higher interest rate. It is more attractive for 
borrowers to have financing with lower and longer-term rates. According to data of 
OECD, Federal Republic of Germany gave out $3,530 million bilateral assistance 
loans with 15.8% tied-loans from 1978 to 1982. Japan’s aid was $6,829 million with 
40.7% tied loans. The most tied loan was issued by the US in which 79.3% of total 
$6,649 million were tied.  
  In 1960, only 41% of American aid was spent on American goods. The 
proportion went up to 79% and 94% in 1963 and in 1965 respectively (Payer, The 
Debt Trap: the IMF and the Third World, 1974). In general, tied loans can reduce the 
costs of foreign exchange, which occurs in purchasing products from the creditor 
country. If all tied loans are used by the recipient country to import goods or services 
from the donor country, there will be no costs of foreign exchange in this trade. The 
tie is effective when the recipient country spends entire loans to import the donor’s 
products that are not previously imported. The more the donor succeeds in tying loans 
to projects that require large quantity of foreign exchange and in financing projects 
that would not have been undertaken without the loan, the more effective the tie will 
be (Holthus & Kebschull, 1985). In the case of tied loans of Addis-Ababa-Djibouti 
Railway, all trains made by Chinese NORICO International can create more foreign 
exchange reserves for China.  
 




  Among the outcomes of renegotiations, asset seizure is considered the least 
favorable to debtors; the write-off is the most favorable outcome. The availability of 
alternative financing sources is the most influencing factor30 (Hopkins, 2019). The 
role of the IMF and Eurobonds in renegotiations with Ghana, Mongolia and Zambia 
helped these countries gain more leverage for borrowing terms. But in the case of Sri 
Lanka, the country was compelled to use asset seizure due to limited borrowing 
resources. Leadership changes in borrowing countries also can influence 
renegotiations with China. New governments tend to alter contract terms with China. 
Maldives and Ecuador both claimed the contracts made with China by their 
predecessors were unfair and needed to be reformed, which made commodity-backed 
loans not guaranteed during renegotiations. Venezuela is showing itself increasingly 
illusioned by underpinning the oil-backed loans from China (Collins, 2019). The 
unstable political situation created a “geo-economics gone wrong” problem for China. 
If the new government derecognizes the loans made by the former president, it will 
create a woe to the BRI.  
  Although there are many risks involved in BRI’s investments, the strong 
political and economic wills of donors and recipients are pushing forward the 
construction of infrastructure. The investments made by SOEs are not only business 
plans but national strategic planning for participants. The projects will serve as 
national strategies like reducing poverty, providing sufficient electric power and better 
transportation in the future. The high demand for infrastructure in developing 
countries has tested local governments. If making money is not the only goal of BRI 
 





in the short run, participants will concern less about the temporary performances of 
investments. The long-term economic growth fueled by infrastructure is the ultimate 
goal of local governments. During Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang’s visit Africa 
in May 2014, he stated that infrastructure should be placed in an important position in 
cooperation between China and Africa. China will support Africa in building a 
network of high-speed railway, a network of highway, a regional network of aviation. 
In January 2015, a “Memorandum of Understanding of Three Networks and 
Promoting Industrialization” was signed by African Union and China. The 
memorandum effectively improves the agreement based on African Agenda 2063, 
which is a vision for next 50 years in Africa. The vision of infrastructure construction 
by 2063 is given in the Agenda: 
   By 2063, the necessary infrastructure will be in place to support 
Africa’s accelerated integration and growth, technological 
transformation, trade and development. This include high-speed 
railway networks, road, shipping lines, sea and air transportation, 
as well as well-developed ICT and the digital economy. A Pan-
African High-Speed Train Network will connect all the major 
cities/capitals of the continent, with adjacent highways and 
pipelines for gap, oil, water, as well as ICT Broadband cables and 
other infrastructure. This will be a catalyst for manufacturing, 
skills development, technology, research and development, 
integration and intra-African trade, investment and tourism. 









       5.3 Cooperation between BRI and the International Institutions 
  The cooperation between BRI and other international institutions was 
incubated under concerns about opacity of contracts. Compared with loans granted by 
the IMF or the World Bank, the terms of many BRI loans are not released to the public. 
This is also the reason that the IMF is reluctant to help BRI members to service their 
BRI loans. China gradually realized the importance of cooperation with the 
international agencies for eliminating concerns. China has funded the China-IMF 
Capacity Development Center, which will train development officials and support 
BRI under the lead of the IMF. In order to have one agency to make decisions about 
BRI, China also built the International Development Cooperation Agency. Western-
backed institutions also co-founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
who announced a memorandum of understanding with the World Bank in April 2017.  
  The desirable economic policies from the IMF perspective would be 
liberalization of foreign exchange and import controls, devaluation of the exchange 
rate, anti-inflationary programs and greater hospitality to foreign investment. The 
recipients will be asked to control bank credit, raise the interest rate and reserve 
requirements. Government spending needs to be curbed, with taxes increases, to 
control government deficit. All these measures are to promote freedom of trade, 
exchange and investment.  
  However, measures that are good for the IMF might not be beneficial to aid 
recipients; foreign-owned companies benefit largely from the liberalization of imports. 
They will have access to more raw materials, machinery and spare parts. Furthermore, 
if these foreign-owned companies are purchasing products from another branch of the 
same multinational company, they can transfer benefits out of the host country by 
accepting the inputs at a higher price. Compared with local companies, these foreign-
74 
 
owned companies are more competitive. The local companies may go out of business 
or cut down production and lay off employees because of liberalization of imports. In 
this case, foreign-owned companies did not create productive power for local 
economy rather than transferring resources to foreign ownership. In the long run, 
remittance of profits by foreign companies will increase developing countries’ debt 
burden.  
  The wage earners and poor consumers are victims of the failure of local 
businesses. Some employees of local companies will be laid off, and those still 
working will have to accept reduced real income which is a key part of IMF wage 
restraint program. One of the basic aims of the IMF is to discourage local consumption 
in order to free resources of export. If more products are exported, then the price of 
products for the domestic market will increase due to the decreasing supply within the 
country. Workers with less income will have to curtail their consumption, and the 
local consumption will decline. In addition, the IMF also strives to cut consumer 
subsidies that are viewed as distortions to the market. Local government is required 
to raise public utility rates if the IMF considers countries below the “economical” 
level.  
  Criticism of the IMF’s aid focuses on how the IMF does not advise nations 
how to reduce imports and develop their own economies. The IMF displayed an 
indifference to the fact that the aid became recipients’ repayment burden of future 
years. The Fund even helped recipients to apply for increased quantities of new credit. 
On one hand, devaluation in developing countries increased the income of producers 
of raw materials, which directly intensified the economic pattern that developing 
countries were trying to escape from. The IMF and developed economies tended to 
rationalize the pattern that the third world economies are suppliers of raw materials. 
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On the other hand, when countries with debt burden are submissive towards the IMF, 
the IMF reschedules their debt repayments. Thus the developing countries did not 
receive suggestions of healthy and diversified economies, but a guidance of temporary 
relief for debt burden. However, rescheduled debts and new aid will still be paid back 
by recipients in the future. The aid recipients are stuck in a vicious circle created by 
the IMF: the IMF releases aid to developing countries for debt repayments, but 
enhances the colonial economic pattern in which the developing countries are left at 
the periphery and will never be able to fully pay back the aid. The poor countries will 
have to run faster and faster just to stay in the same place (Payer, The Debt Trap: the 
IMF and the Third World, 1974). 
  The developing countries will find themselves in a dilemma when they 
borrow external debts. The borrowers must accept scrutiny if they decide to borrow 
from the IMF. As a result, the essential projects to national welfare (like BRI projects) 
might need to be given up, and the industrial development might be disturbed by the 
IMF’s dictation. If the borrowers turn to commercial loans, to which the IMF objects 
because of the high interest rates, they will be exposed to even higher interest rates. 
“Debt slavery” is the term used by Cheryl Payer in the book “The Debt Trap” to 
describe developing countries’ situations. The aim of the IMF is neither financing 
developing countries once and for all, nor starving the people of these countries to 
death. The IMF indentures developing countries closely to developed countries by 
debts, and orders the debtors to labor on plantations. The developing countries are 
refused to finance building their own businesses by the IMF. The debt slavery system 
keeps developing countries in underdevelopment, or makes them the servers of 
multinational enterprises at the expense of their own development of economy.  
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  The World Bank and the IMF have different functions in theory: the IMF 
provides short-term loans to maintain healthy balance-of-payments, and the Bank is a 
creditor and guarantor for specific projects. However, there is overlap between 
functions of these two institutions in practice. The World Bank also provides support 
on balance-of-payments with liberation and financial discipline attached. The IMF is 
also an aid organizer and member of aid consortia.  
  The World Bank helps the expansion of private capital to developing 
countries by measures that are similar to those used by the IMF. The Bank supports 
exports which benefit multinational corporations. It also opposes minimum wage and 
trade union activity. Any protection of local businesses, as well as local government’s 
control of basic resources, will be refused by the World Bank. All these measures can 
be used to pry away developing countries’ control over the national economy, and will 
ultimately benefit international capital and local elites. There are four levels that the 
Bank can influence (Payer, The World Bank, 1982): the individual projects, the sector, 
the national policies and the indirect influences. It is straightforward that the World 
Bank can make changes to the funded projects and industries through cooperation 
with local governments. The direction of national policies can also be changed under 
the efforts of the Bank, the IMF and local governments. Alleviation of poverty—the 
indirect influence—is not well realized through the World Bank’s funds. The funded 
countries are usually corrupt, unjust and inegalitarian, which makes it difficult for the 
Bank to run a progressive and beneficial project. However, the Bank’s indifference to 
extremely inequitable income distribution in local societies is detrimental to the poor 
in local countries. Only a few people, local elites, benefit from the World Bank’s 
projects. Besides, the priority to the benefits of foreign investment is well considered 
by the World Bank, who can force local governments to give up progressive policies. 
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  There are six stages that the borrowers must go through when they borrow 
form the World Bank: identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiations, 
implementation and supervision, and evaluation. These stages ensure feasibility of 
invested projects, but they are time consuming. The second step, preparation, usually 
takes one to two years for the World Bank. The Bank staff will review the projects 
from technical, institutional, economic and financial aspects; almost all appraisals 
include an economic cost-benefit analysis. The costs and benefits to a society are taken 
into account and the Bank will lend the funds when the benefits of the loan are greater 
than the opportunity cost. However, the sophisticated analysis is difficult to use in the 
field. Because shadow prices, wages and interest rate are used in the analysis, the 
processes are largely arbitrary. The role of “hunch, guesstimate and judgement” is 
enormous (Stewart, 1978). The use of distributional weights is rarely used in the 
analysis. And there are enormous externalities to be calculated so that the choice of 
what to include in the calculation is wide. After all, in the cost-benefit analysis, a 
decision made on political grounds, not an objective investment analysis.  
  Negotiations happen between the World Bank staff and the executive 
directors of borrowing countries in which the United States and other developed 
economies have interests. These negotiations are normally not documented, but 
extremely important. In the step of implementation and supervision, the World Bank 
supervises the procurement of projects by progress reports sent by the borrowers. The 
Bank also sends its staff into the field for short supervision missions. For the last step, 
evaluation, the Operation Evaluation Department will review and audit projects in the 
borrowing countries. The audit is mainly to estimate the time and cost of the projects 
in order to determine whether the anticipated rate of return is achieved. 
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  However, the cooperation between BRI and other institutions is limited to 
mutual understanding and is difficult to be deepened. First, it is not practical for a 
country to have a co-funded project by multilateral institutions and bilateral 
institutions in terms of the dominance of the project. Like the saying “one nation 
cannot have two queens,” China and the IMF/World Bank will have to negotiate over 
ultimate control of the project. All BRI projects are being arranged by Chinese state-
owned enterprises currently. Some Chinese small private firms are also participating 
in the BRI but mainly focus on subcontracts overseas, they do not directly contract 
with local governments in infrastructure construction. The Chinese SOEs, who enjoy 
a central government’s privileges, dominate the BRI projects. If other international 
institutions join the funding of the BRI projects, these institutions will have to share 
voting rights with the Chinese SOEs. In terms of the process of decision-making, it is 
not necessary and goes against the wills of the Chinese SOEs to give up the dominance 
over the projects. Keep in mind that this step of preparation for funding by the IMF 
will take one to two years. The low efficiency of the IMF will not be accepted by the 
Chinese SOEs. Second, Western economies who back the IMF/World Bank are 
cautious about the expansion of the BRI. Given all the negative news of the BRI, it is 
hard to imagine that the IMF supports the BRI projects. The political and economic 
foundation for this international cooperation is not solid enough to help pushing 
forward the Chinese global strategy. The major supporter of the IMF/World Bank, the 
United States, has no initiative to improve its competitor’s global influences. On the 
side of China, it also lacks mutual benefits and experiences for the cooperation. There 
has been no sign of cooperation with the Western World to develop the BRI in the 
main stream of consensus in China. Most Chinese think tanks are still in the stage of 
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conquering critiques from the West, which builds up an invisible curtain between 




This research paper is conducted for a popular topic in both western and 
eastern media nowadays. The key question is whether the BRI a debt trap. This paper 
starts with introducing the current conditions of external debt of three BRI members. 
Based on analysis on these countries’ financial ratios in comparison with Mexico’s 
debt crisis, some similar scenarios associated with debt crises in three selected BRI 
members are explored. With the help of causes of debt crisis and relief solutions in 
the literature review, the findings of this paper present the deep reasons for three 
selected BRI members to patriciate the program, as well as some measures already 
taken for prevention of debt crisis. Generally speaking, the BRI cannot be defined as 
a debt trap according to this research. By comparing external debt conditions of 
different BRI countries, I found certain countries do have possibilities of debt crisis 
due to BRI. However, the number of these countries is limited. And many countries 
who are vulnerable to debt burdens have already eliminated the risks by self-
corrections.  By the end of January 2020, 138 countries will have participated in the 
BRI program. Only eight countries, which are introduced by the Center for Global 
Development in the first chapter, are exposed to debt risk. Furthermore, the analysis 
of the three selected countries among the eight targets shows that the symptoms of 
debt crisis are not severe enough to overthrow the economic foundation of three BRI 
countries or the whole BRI project. The concerns of the Western world will be 
reasonable if we consider the rare situations of certain struggling countries are general 
conditions for all BRI members. Most members are well leveraging the BRI projects
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and improving their infrastructure. The roles of international institutions are also 
discussed to explore more borrowing methods for developing countries. Readers can 
better understand the current situations of BRI members and the role of BRI financial 
institutions by comparing multilateral borrowing with bilateral borrowing.   
  The gap for infrastructure investment in developing countries does exist and 
there has not been an effective way to fulfil it. Developing countries need capital to 
develop their infrastructure and to escape from the fate of the periphery. It is rare that 
a country’s economy takes off without taking on any foreign debt, especially for the 
developing countries after World War Two. Singapore, Korea and Taiwan all started 
with heavy external funds to achieve their development. BRI countries who borrow 
external debts are taking the same route that China undertook in the 1980s. The strong 
political connections between China and BRI members lay the foundations for BRI 
projects; the BRI cooperation models provide necessary tools for execution. To avoid 
potential debt crises, BRI members ought to efficiently manage and utilize their 
external debts. Investment in their vital projects, various sources of borrowing and 
timely debt solutions can all benefit local people and economies. If we use a metaphor 
for the BRI, we might imagine a junior-year college student with student loan is a BRI 
member who is going to take on external debt. The student needs to borrow more from 
the Department of Education to receive a degree. There is no doubt that the student 
should finish their college education with the help from the Department of Education 
if no other accessible funds exist. But the challenge is that the student should maintain 
the student loan under solvency, because after graduation the department will require 
the student to repay the loan after a grace period. The student should ensure their 
education will facilitate their job hunt in order to generate cash flow for the loan 
repayment. Otherwise, the student will be buried beneath the loan till their bankruptcy. 
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In reality, most students graduate with a certain amount of student loans and start 
repaying those loans after they are employed. It will be a matter of time before the 
student can pay off the loan, no matter what industry they work in. The infrastructure 
in BRI projects, as the student loan to student, should be matched with the size of local 
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